Thomas offered an alternative method of conducting war to that of Grant. Thomas's method can be summed up as follows: Take care of your men and train them well, plan thoroughly so as to put yourself in the position to improvise with minimal risk, force or trick your opponent to attack you on ground of your choosing, know the terrain better than your opponent does, have a reserve ready for flanking movements, be open to technological innovation, NEVER throw massed forces against a single point of your opponents line (because it almost never really works and is always expensive), and strike hard when it counts. Thomas always tried to coordinate attacks at 2 or 3 or more different points of the enemy's position so that the enemy commander could never know which was the main thrust. This method requires a lot of very dull homework on the part of the practitioner, which doesn't recommend it to the hasty or the distracted.

In this Thomas was in agreement with Rosecrans who did well enough by this method until he disregarded Thomas's advice to first consolidate in Chattanooga before going after Bragg in Georgia. Instead Rosecrans got overconfident (also bowing to intense pressure from Washington), dispersed his forces, and stumbled into a battle before he had got set (fn5).

Following the above named precepts, Thomas had been phenomenally successful until then in every battle or segment thereof where he had commanded. On the other hand, Grant's method was a study in contrasts to that of Thomas. Grant sums it up himself in his Chattanooga battle report in this way: “…the great object being to mass all the force possible against one given point.” This was in accordance with the Napoleonic doctrine taught at West Point before the war, but already outdated in 1849 with the introduction of the minié bullet and rifling. Grant's method would still work given a preponderance of force, but the human cost would be very high.

However, Grant had an advantage over Thomas: Grant was from Ohio. Thomas was from Virginia and had therefore renounced his political base when he returned south "at the head of my men" (fn6). It is difficult for us today to conceive the importance of regional politics and its effect on the military of those times, because our political parameters have changed. Today corporations dominate politics, but back then the dominant forces were the state political machines. Thomas had no potential usefulness to these machines and their would-be president makers and exploiters. Indeed, there were many politicians who professed to distrust Thomas, suspecting him of doubtful loyalty and perhaps, in the long run, of not being amenable to a policy of looting a defeated adversary.

Before I begin discussing this confrontation I want to outline the possible background of a personality conflict between Grant and Thomas. Consider what it was like to be a career officer in the pre Civil War army. If you were from the South, and especially from Virginia, you had the better chance of promotion because of Virginia’s decades long domination of the war department. Northern born officers therefore had years to conceive and then nurture a grudge against southern born officers. For whatever reason, Grant’s career had stagnated before the Civil War, and Thomas, the quintessential Virginian, had made steady progress. Of course, this disadvantage was completely reversed with the start of the war, but that does not mean that old resentments were forgotten. After the unprecedented carnage of Shiloh, Halleck arrived on the scene and took charge. He apparently disapproved of the way Grant had handled the battle, so he made Grant a supernumerary second in command, placed Grant’s troops under Thomas, and spent most of his time at Thomas’s headquarters (the right wing) during the slow approach to Corinth. Grant was decidedly unhappy about this, although he probably needn't have been (fn7). Shortly thereafter, Thomas requested that Grant’s troops be restored to him, perhaps thereby only adding fuel to the fire. Finally, every one of Grant’s victories up until his arrival at Chattanooga had drawn much criticism. Knowing this as well as anyone, Grant faced Thomas whose record of command success to that point had been an unimpeachable 100 % (fn7.5).

On the other hand, Thomas must have resented Grant’s very presence there as an affront and a suggestion that Thomas couldn’t do the job alone (fn8). Thomas also surely did not approve of Grant’s improvised approach to doing battle which led to avoidable suffering and death among the troops in his own commands (fn9). At some point he perhaps began to suspect that Grant had even deeper motives for being there. So, when Grant arrived at Chattanooga on 23 Oct. 1863, the stage was set for a behind the scenes confrontation. They both knew each other very well, and both had reasons for mistrusting the other. According to adjutant James H. Wilson's often and variously retold anecdote about Grant’s first arrival at Chattanooga, Thomas let him know from the beginning he wasn’t particularly welcome (fn10). However,  according to Horace Porter in his "Campaigning with Grant" the scene was quite different: Porter recounts that a member of Thomas's staff first pointed out the situation. Apparently Grant had first ordered a staff meeting before worrying about his creature comforts, and summoning the staff officers seemed to be Thomas's first priority after the hasty meal. But Wilson's anecdote, harmless as he tells it but villainous as the apologists retell it, is the version most commonly cited (fn11).

Another factor influencing Grant's behavior was the freshness of his promotion to commander of the Division of the Mississippi. If successful in Chattanooga, Grant could expect to be called east in order to deal with the Lee problem on which many a good man before him had bitten out his teeth. However, if Grant were to stumble in his new assignment, the only possible choice to succeed him would have been Thomas. To buttress his position for the moment and against the possibility of future setbacks in the East, Grant needed a certain kind of victory in Chattanooga, one which would propel his fairly pliant lieutenant Sherman forward and not unduly enhance the reputation of Thomas. Sherman’s limited grasp of battlefield dynamics didn’t matter. His political connections (his brother a U.S. senator, father-in-law a former senator) and his willingness to apply himself to Grant’s larger design did matter. In other words, Grant came to Chattanooga in order to head Thomas off at the pass, already planning to promote Sherman over Thomas at the end of this battle. Politically at least it was "nolo contendere" because Thomas was one of those rare top commanders who focused more on the military objective than his personal advancement. However, as far as the strictly military objective of securing Chattanooga and doing as much damage to Bragg’s army as possible was concerned, Thomas would not back down, not even to Grant.

Grant’s plan consisted of giving Sherman the major role and the credit for the victory, and as little as possible of both to Thomas. Sherman was to have the bulk of the troops, and Thomas and Hooker were to do no more than demonstrate and then cooperate with Sherman once Sherman had crushed Bragg's northern flank. This plan is outlined in Grant's order of 18 Nov. 63 to Thomas and Sherman which I quote here from Grant's battle report of 23 Dec.63:

 Maj. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS: All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's position on Missionary Ridge by Saturday at daylight. Not being provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the mountains, and other places [but he did have a scientific contour map], such definite instructions cannot be given as might be desirable. However, the general plan, you understand, is for Sherman, with the force brought with him, strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a crossing of the Tennessee River just below the mouth of Chickamauga, his crossing to be protected by artillery from the heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your chief of artillery); and to secure the heights from the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can concentrate against him. You will co-operate with Sherman. The troops in Chattanooga Valley should be well concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend fortifications on the right and center, and a movable column of one division in readiness to move whenever ordered. This division should show itself as threateningly [only a “demonstration”] as possible on the most practicable line for making an attack up the valley. Your effort then will be to form a junction with Sherman, making your advance well toward the northern end of Missionary Ridge, and moving as near simultaneously with him as possible. The juncture once formed, and the ridge carried, communications will be at once established between the two armies by roads on the south bank of the river. Farther movements will then depend on those of the enemy.

Strangely enough, neither the original of this order quoted here, nor the copy of it to Sherman which Grant mentions, is present in the Official Records of the Civil War. We have only Grant's report, and there is no other corroboration of a written version of this order. But more about this later.

In order to carry out this plan Sherman had on 25 Nov., according to Baldy Smith (fn12), "six perfectly appointed divisions" (3 of his own plus 3 borrowed from Thomas and Hooker), whereas Thomas had 4 and Hooker almost 3. On his own left flank (next to S. Chickamauga Creek), Sherman had the 2 divisions under Howard (borrowed from Hooker) which were not even deployed on the 25th, although they would have been opposed only by Wright’s brigade from taking Chickamauga Station 8 miles away (fn13). The division of J.C. Davis (borrowed from Thomas) remained in the rear to guard the river crossing (against what, against whom?). In addition, in the early afternoon of 25 Nov. Grant detached yet another division from Thomas (Baird’s) and sent it toward Sherman (which would have brought his total to seven divisions!) who sent it back because he had no place to put it. However, with the belated exception of Bushbeck’s brigade, Sherman made no use of the reinforcements. He relied on his own troops from the army of the Tennessee, and even those he used badly, throwing them in a brigade at a time. He obviously was in the manic phase of his repeated manic-depressive cycles and expected an easy triumph, but he had yet to meet in battle an all-rounder like Cleburne who, unlike Johnston and Pemberton, would also attack. In addition Cleburne, by using an approach to troop management similar to that of Thomas, had developed his division into the most effective shock troops of the entire Confederate army. On the 25th Sherman was not just halted by Cleburne with less than a quarter of his forces, he was thrown back. More than 200 of his men were even captured in a counter-attack and spent the rest of the war in Andersonville. Sherman's attack was, as Cozzens writes, "one of the sorriest episodes in this or any other battle of the war" (fn14).

The situation was critical at 2:30 PM on 25 Nov. for both Grant and Thomas, but for different reasons. The day was almost over, and if something wasn't done shortly, Bragg was going to get away with no more than a bloody nose. But if something were done too soon (under the mounting pressure from Sherman and Grant), then Thomas's troops might be repulsed, would in any case suffer excessive casualties, and Bragg might be able to claim not just a draw, but a victory. Grant was not worried about excessive casualties, but rather about his derailed plan and Sherman’s stalled attack, so Grant started ordering Thomas to move his 4 divisions (just after Baird returned) forward to the base of the ridge and then stop (fn15), ostensibly to induce Bragg to cease reinforcing Cleburne (fn16), in any case no more than a demonstration. This order has been called “foolish”, “not thought out” and “quixotic” by sundry authors because the Union soldiers would thus have been exposed to galling fire from above and unable to defend themselves.

In his battle report of 23 Dec. 1863 Grant writes this about the “order”:

“Thomas was accordingly directed to move forward his troops, constituting our center, Baird's division (Fourteenth Corps), Wood's and Sheridan's divisions (Fourth Corps), and Johnson's division (Fourteenth Corps), with a double line of skirmishers thrown out, followed in easy supporting distance by the whole force, and carry the rifle-pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge, and when carried to reform his lines on the rifle-pits with a view to carrying the top of the ridge [italics mine].

I call attention again to the fact that the entire weight of eye-witness testimony lends credence to the issuance of quite a different verbal order, namely to only take the rifle pits and stop (fn15).

There is yet another order in the Official Records dated 24 Nov. which almost supports Grant’s version of events, but not quite. Grant does not mention this order in his battle report, although he cites verbatim four other orders (2 to Burnside, 1 to Thomas, and 1 to Sherman, plus 1 reply from Burnside and 1 communication from Bragg). Instead Grant quotes this order twenty years later in his Memoirs on p. 340. I cite here the version present in the Official Records (fn17):

"HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, Chattanooga, Tenn., November 24, 1863.
Maj. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS, Commanding Army of the Cumberland:
GENERAL: General Sherman carried Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnel, with only slight skirmishing. His right now rests at the tunnel and on top of the hill; his left at Chickamauga Creek.
I have instructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will be in co-operation.
Your command will either carry the rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them [italics mine] or move to the left, as the presence of the enemy may require. If Hooker's present position on the mountain can be maintained with a small force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with all the force he can spare and ascend by the first practicable road."

This order for a dawn assault toward the center of Missionary Ridge was never carried out. Some authors, citing only Fullerton's report on Chattanooga in Battles & Leaders III 723, write that Grant, upon seeing in the morning that Sherman hadn't yet reached the tunnel, "suspended his orders". Others write that Thomas ignored or even "flouted" it. In any, case the Official Records contain no document which explains why this order was not carried out. Note that no time of day is given for the issuance of this order, note also the vagueness of the words “and ridge directly in front of them”. Such imprecision is unusual from a man famous for his concise, clear orders. I repeat, in his battle report of 23 Dec.63 Grant does not mention this order. It seems to this author that Grant would surely have cited this order in his battle report if he could have. This leads this author to propose two explanations:

"After a very brief rest [in the rifle pits], an effort was made to move the men forward, which it was found a very difficult thing to do. The long, steep ascent in front covered with the enemy, the top lined with numerous batteries and breastworks, was well calculated to appall the stoutest hearts. It was, therefore, not strange that men required much urging to induce them to brave the danger [italics mine]. My efforts were directed entirely to the officers and men of my command to move them forward, irrespective of the previous order of the lines or of the movement of other regiments, and in this effort I was zealously and efficiently assisted by many of the officers of my command."

So much for the spontaneous urge of the Union troops to be better generals than their commanders. Whatever theory one chooses, it is apparent that, on the afternoon of 25 Nov. 1863, Grant is gradually losing his grasp of the overall situation while Thomas is gradually taking over.

Note the times in my timetable below, and note again that Grant, at every step of the campaign, had explicitly relegated Thomas and Hooker to supporting and demonstrative roles. Thomas had proposed a concentration against Bragg's southern flank, but was turned down. Thomas then had to nudge Grant into authorizing Hooker's attack on Lookout Mountain, and then his movement against Rossville Gap. Then, as things went wrong on the afternoon of 25 Nov., Thomas came under increasing pressure to throw in his troops (first 4, then 3, then 4 divisions) against Bragg’s 5 divisions in the center into the attack. The pressure came first from Sherman, as we can see from the following exchange of messages (fn30):

"MISSION RIDGE STATION, November 25, 1863--12.45 p.m.
Major-General GRANT: Where is Thomas? SHERMAN, Major-General."

The reply came directly from Thomas:

"ORCHARD KNOB, November 25, 1863--1 p.m.
Major-General SHERMAN: I am here; my right is closing in from Lookout Mountain toward Missionary Ridge. GEO. H. THOMAS, Major-General."

Then Grant started to add pressure, as will be explained in detail below. First he ordered to Sherman yet another division from Thomas (Baird’s), then he began to first suggest and then order Thomas to intervene. However, Thomas repeatedly stalled the carrying out of Grant's murderous limited demonstration order until he was sure that Hooker had engaged Stewart, thus reducing the risk of uselessly sacrificing his precious Army of the Cumberland in favor of Grant’s failed and politically motivated plan.

Grant had reason to be nervous about Sherman well before 2:30 PM on 25 Nov. Sherman's troops had started crossing the to the south bank of the Tennessee at around 2 AM on 24. Nov. By dawn about 8000 troops were already landed. Instead of moving forward immediately, Sherman waited until his entire force was across before getting underway. Nine hours later Sherman, after having covered all of 3 miles and encountered no more than skirmishers, entrenched on the first rise (named "Billy the Goat Hill" after the battle according to local Chattanooga historian Bob Graham). He then reported to Grant that he had reached the tunnel, the objective stated in his orders (fn31). Grant took the message at face value and telegraphed Washington that Sherman had taken the ridge up to the tunnel. However, Sherman had stopped and entrenched too soon. He was not yet at the object of his orders as he reported that evening. Thanks to this error, Cleburne was allowed to move in that same afternoon to fill the void on Tunnel Hill. He then spent the night preparing his defenses. The next morning when Sherman started his attack, he was more than a mile to the north of the tunnel. When the fog lifted at about 9:00 AM this must have been apparent to all observers on Orchard Knob. Grant thus had several hours to formulate a contingency plan. However, if we are to lend credence to Sherman's battle report of 19 Dec. 63 (see appendix 7), Grant had even more time than that. I quote:

"Thus we passed the night [of 24 Nov.], heavy details being kept busy at work on the intrenchments on the hill [Billy the Goat]. During the night the sky cleared away bright and a cold frost filled the air, and our camp fires revealed to the enemy and to our friends in Chattanooga our position on Missionary Ridge [Is this a concealed rebuke to Grant and/or Thomas for not having warned him?]."

How had Sherman made such an error? In the middle of Nov. he briefly came to Chattanooga to confer with Grant. He writes in his Memoirs that he (together with Grant), on the morning of 15 Nov., walked to Ft. Wood to inspect the northern end of the ridge (fn32). From that point the tunnel entrance is about 3 1/2 miles away and masked by a spur of the ridge. However, the dip in the ridge under which the tunnel is located - the second notch from the north - is perfectly visible with the naked eye from today’s Ft. Wood Historical District. The next afternoon he rode along the north bank of the Tennessee to again inspect the northern end of the ridge. He writes (fn33):

“In company with Generals Thomas, W.F. Smith, Brannan, and others, we [i.e. Sherman and Grant] crossed by the flying bridge, rode back of the hills some four miles, left our horses and got on a hill overlooking the whole ground about the mouth of the Chickamauga River, and across to the Missionary Hills near the tunnel.”

This is the same hill which Thomas and Baldy Smith had visited on 7 Nov. and from which they could see the Confederate campfires on the ridge. This point is about 4 miles from the tunnel mouth and is probably today’s River Hills or "Continental" Hill, from either of which you can also see the two notches (or depressions if you will) mentioned above.

In Sherman’s defense it must be noted that from both vantage points the two notches could be considered mere undulations in the ridge contour, and that the tunnel mouth itself is rendered invisible from the one direction by a spur from the ridge, and from the other direction by the least amount of vegetation surrounding the tunnel. It is very difficult to ascertain today how much vegetation had been left standing by the Confederates. Much (but by no means all of it) had been removed for creating fields of fire, for firewood, and for creating primitive housing erected on the flats just to the west of the ridge.

It has been objected that today’s observer is already informed about the depth of the cuts delineating what today is called Tunnel Hill or Sherman Reservation, and is therefore at an advantage over Sherman. Against this I oppose the observation that looking at passes through a telescope and judging the actual terrain was part of Sherman’s business, because passes, even small ones, were supremely important in those times, given the almost entire dependence on horses to draw heavier equipment such as cannon. In mountainous terrain passes were the surest ways to either outflank the enemy or to be outflanked by the enemy.

Regardless of whatever Sherman actually saw or thought he saw on these two occasions, either nobody pointed out to him the actual distance from the first rise of the ridge (Billygoat Hill) to the tunnel (under the 2nd notch), or Sherman was told and wasn’t listening. I conclude that Sherman was told, but blinded by the foretaste of certain victory, was too exalted to worry about such details, but the reader is free to draw another conclusion if he or she finds one to suit.

There is another possibility: In the bustle of working all night and much of the following day while moving 30,000 or so soldiers across a river and then 3 miles inland, Sherman simply became confused during the day on 24 Nov. and perhaps became totally flustered on the evening of 24 Nov. when he discovered he wasn’t where he was supposed to be. So he perhaps lied in his report to Grant that evening and really put his mentor and protector in an embarrassing position. I leave it up to the reader to imagine how Grant felt about being put in a spot like that (fn34).

In his battle report Sherman afterward stated that the northern end of the ridge appeared to be “continuous” and vaguely cited “wrongly laid down maps”. Thomas was, however, famous for his maps which his secret service topography engineers produced. I cite here Baldy Smith, Thomas’s chief engineer, concerning the map-work carried out before the battle (fn35):

“I forward with this a map large enough to show the strategic movements made before the battle, and also a map giving the battlefield. These maps are mainly due to the exertions of Captain West, U.S. Coast Survey, of my staff, and to the labors of Captains Dorr and Donn, of the same Department, who have been ordered to report to me by Professor Bache, Superintendent U.S. Coast Survey…By them the distances were determined before the battle [italics mine] for the use of artillery, and also the heights of artillery positions occupied by us and the enemy.”

In other words, the map Grant submitted along with his battle report had been made before the battle. The referral here is to a contour map prepared by C.S. Mergell which is now part of the Atlas to Accompany the Official Records (fn36). This is thus also the map which Grant apparently had before the battle which indeed lacks “names of roads, spurs of the mountains, and other places”, and upon which the principal troop dispositions were superimposed after the battle (with the interesting omission of Hooker at Rossville Gap). The lower left hand corner of this map is devoted to naming the manifold map studies (plane table surveys, compass surveys, and reconnaissance surveys) undertaken by scores of scouts under the supervision of at least 10 officers between major and lieutenant) which were used to prepare this map now in the Atlas. I refer here to a footnote which illustrates how one such scout and topographical engineer, Ambrose Bierce, in Hazen’s command (under Thomas) worked (fn37). In short, in Thomas’s headquarters before the battle of Chattanooga there was a mass of map materials which prove conclusively that the entire area was perfectly known to the topographical engineers in Thomas’s command.

In another of Grant's enigmatic orders (the one of 7 Nov. instructing Thomas to attack the northern end of the ridge the next day, before either Sherman or Hooker had arrived), Grant himself reveals that he knew that Thomas was very well informed about the area in question when he writes: "You having been over this country and having had a better opportunity of studying it than myself, the details are left to you." What kept Grant so busy that he didn't have time for such "details"?

In any case, the map Grant had in his possession before the battle is in all probability also Sherman’s “wrongly laid-down” one. If the reader will consult the Atlas to the Official Records, he or she will see that it clearly and scientifically indicates the contours of the ridge, the principle elevations thereof, and the course of the two railroads along with the position of the railroad tunnel named as the objective in Sherman’s orders. Two more maps, one from 1863 and another from 1896 (but based on the maps made before the battle) indicate the extent of the mapping of the area. They both clearly show the major elevations which confronted Sherman. In addition, the second 1896 map shows the unit dispositions of both armies, and it can be acquired by contacting the NPS bookstore at Chickamauga. These maps prove that this area was anything but virgin territory to the topographical engineers of the day.

The map Grant submitted with his battle report of 23 Dec. indeed lacks the “names of roads, spurs of the mountains, and other places”, but it does have the names and locations of the houses of 8 private citizens clustered around the northern end of the ridge, indicating intensive scouting efforts in that area preparatory to Sherman's effort there. The mapmakers' scouts had probably been there to talk to these people.

In addition, there is anecdotal information (from Henry Boyd, native and lifelong resident of Chattanooga and student of its history), according to which the area benefited from some unusual scouting operations. Namely the house owned by Mrs. Magill located on Shallow Ford Road east of the ridge and indicated on all period maps of this area, was a brothel frequented by both Confederate and Union officers during the siege of Chattanooga. Apparently the informal truce established between the two sides shortly after the Union army dug in at Chattanooga extended further than is commonly supposed.

If Grant’s map was indeed Sherman’s “wrongly laid-down map”, then Sherman had the means to be sufficiently informed in order be able to orient himself among the elevations and cuts of the northern end of the ridge. If he had a different map, then all he had to do was include it in his battle report, but he didn’t. I quote from Sherman's report of 19 Dec. 63 in order to name the only map he did include, i.e. a map his staff officer prepared after the battle:

"Inclosed you will please find a map of that part of the battle-field of Chattanooga fought on by the troops under my command, surveyed and drawn by Captain Jenney, of my staff."

As I have proposed above, the best explanation for Sherman's disorientation is that he was distracted, overconfident, and then simply confused under the pressure of a battle situation, and his mention of defective maps fits in with his behavior in other embarrassing situations during his military career. In other words, he lied.

Could Thomas and/or his staff have done even more to make sure that Sherman was completely informed about the terrain between the river bank and his stated objective? Or did Thomas and his staff simply shrug their shoulders in the face of such massive (and previously demonstrated) incompetence, knowing that they would be able to salvage the situation anyway? Perhaps. The following quote illustrates Thomas’s basic estimation of his situation before the battle of Chattanooga: “We greatly outnumber Bragg’s army and, if in our attack we can bring the crushing weight of our full force to bear, we are sure to win” (fn38). As McKinney writes: “From this point on [23 Nov.], by luck and foresight, Thomas saturated the Battles for Chattanooga with his military talent” (fn39). In short, Thomas was able to compensate for whatever shortcomings the Grant and Sherman team brought to Chattanooga, and he knew it.

Should Thomas and/or his staff have done more? That is debatable, especially in light of the subsequent falsification of the course of the battle which we find in Grant’s and Sherman’s battle reports. Cozzens writes: ”Only minutes after Thomas’s troops crowned Missionary Ridge, [Grant] began rewriting history” (fn40).

In my opinion, the most likely explanation of Grant’s oblique remark in his battle report of 23 Dec. 63 about “not being provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the mountains, and other places” is that he was trying to lend cautious support in his inimitable way to Sherman’s canard about the “wrongly laid-down” maps, hoping that subsequent historians and readers would not take the trouble to follow this paper trail and discover the probable identity of the two maps. Note again that this order of 18 Nov., which Grant quotes in his battle report,  is not otherwise present in the Official Records of the Civil War. It is only present in the OR's only as part of Grant's report of 23 Dec. (OR 31/2,55, p 31). This author therefore suspects that the actual order of 18 Nov., as Grant quotes it, was either verbal, or if it was issued in writing on or about the 18th, the wording was different from that of the one in the report. In order to hide this discrepancy, the actual order (if it existed) could have been removed from the Official Records as were others, such as several of the communications between Grant and Sherman on 24 and 25 Nov. 63 (fn31). The reader, again, remains free to propose his or her own explanation for these goings on.

By the way, the 1896 Map of the Battlefields of Chattanooga and Wauhatchie prepared under the direction of the then secretary of war Daniel Lamont (during the presidency of the democrat Grover Cleveland) gives a much clearer and more accurate disposition of the troops than the Atlas map and  In order to see what this map looks like, click here.

In the light of such easily available information, the statements of some authors such as Brooks Simpson “Ulysses S. Grant, 1822-1865” can only surprise the discerning reader. I quote from p. 239: “Before long there was bad news, Sherman sent word that in fact he had not taken Tunnel Hill - a deep ravine just north of that location, which had escaped Union observation [italics mine], served to give the Confederates an ideal defensive position.” As the preceding exposition makes clear, the entire area was completely mapped by Union topographers. The statement that the ravine served to give an “ideal defensive position” can only be the result of lack of careful reading about Cleburne’s conduct of the defense and ignorance about the terrain in question. Cleburne in fact set up his defensive line at least 500 yards south of the ravine and near the top of a gentle slope almost at the far end of Tunnel Hill. In general, Simpson’s treatment of the battle of Chattanooga betrays serious defects in interpretation of available sources.

Regardless of the availability of adequate maps to Sherman and Grant, the bulk of the evidence indicates some sort or breakdown in the cooperation between the staffs of Grant, Sherman, and Thomas which goes beyond Grant’s and Sherman’s notorious carelessness in such matters. At the very least we must conclude that the tensions between Grant and Thomas must have been higher than any historian I have read has been willing to postulate. At any time the most detailed information Grant could desire was there in abundance in Thomas’s headquarters. All Grant and Sherman had to do was ask, if they dared or cared to. Were they too proud or too intimidated to ask?

It is important to grasp this question of maps because it concretely documents one way that Grant and Sherman manipulated the record in order to obscure the record of what went wrong for them on 24 and 25 Nov. 63. Once this is understood, then it is possible to then understand the often and variously described drama between the two generals Thomas and Grant which took place on Orchard Knob the afternoon of 25 Nov. 63.

Every author I have read who deals with the events on Orchard Knob on the afternoon of 25 Nov. tells the story differently with considerable variation. Some authors quote from the Grant order of the evening of 24 Nov. for Thomas to take the rifle pits and the ridge “directly in front of them”. I repeat, this order is not quoted in his battle report, although four other orders (plus one response and a communication from Bragg) are quoted verbatim. Of the two authors who have most recently written books devoted to this battle, Sword mentions the order of the 24th with no reference to the words “and ridge directly in front of them”. The other, Cozzens, states that Thomas "flouted" this order, and doesn't go into further discussion of the matter. Cozzens allows no connection between this order and that of the afternoon of 25 Nov. Cozzens roundly states that the version referred to in Grant’s battle report did not exist (fn18).

Thomas in his report only summarizes Grant’s order of 18 Nov. (without mention of date), and I quote here directly from Thomas’s battle report of 1 Dec. 1863:

“I was to co-operate with Sherman by concentrating my troops in Chattanooga Valley, on my left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend the fortifications on the right and center, with a movable column of one division in readiness to move wherever ordered. This division was to show itself as threateningly as possible on the most practicable line for making an attack up the valley. I was then to effect a junction with Sherman, making my advance from the left, well toward the north end of Mission Ridge, and moving as near simultaneously with Sherman as possible.”

If Grant felt that it served his purpose to "quote" his order of 24 Nov. in his subsequent battle report, he would have. That he didn’t means that he couldn’t at the time, or that it, in his opinion, did not sufficiently support his argument. Therefore, Grant’s unsupported reference to such an order in his battle report can be discounted as irrelevant and/or mendacious.

For these reasons I will, in the following, accept Thomas’s, Buell’s, Cozzens’s and Sword’s (and others’), version of the limited advance order and proceed from the assumption that the basic plan outlined in Grant’s "formal" order of 18 Nov. was still standing the afternoon of 25 Nov. As far as the outline of the events that afternoon and the timetable of Grant’s enunciation of the order as it is most often reported is concerned, I have decided to follow Cozzens while referring to one of the most reliable contemporaries (Baldy Smith), and try to deduce the rest as much as possible from the battle reports of the major commanders at Chattanooga.

For the next part of this paper the reader should refer to appendix 1: “Comparative timetable of events on 25 Nov. 1863”.

When Grant started giving his order to Thomas at about 2:30 PM on 25 Nov., at first as a suggestion (fn41), he did not yet know that Sherman was not just repulsed. He could not have dreamed that Sherman had already given up without telling anyone and would in fact recall all of the advanced units at 4 PM (fn42). However, he must have known that, if something wasn't done, Bragg was going to save his army, in effect pull out at least a draw with incalculable consequences for Lincoln's prosecution of the war, not to mention for Grant’s career.

The morning of 25 Nov. Hooker was impatient and requested orders at 9:20 (fn43). At around 9:30 AM, after the fog had cleared, he received via flag signal from Thomas on Orchard Knob the order to move to Rossville Gap (What had happened to the “telegraph” of the day before, also mentioned in Hooker’s report?). That his columns were already in motion by 10 AM indicates that they were in a state of readiness when the order was received. In fact, Hooker had been held back until that point by Grant who kept fine-tuning his plan of battle, first ordering a dawn demonstration toward the rifle pits and then canceling the order according to Sword (fn44), and it seems unlikely that Thomas could have been in favor of either the dawn attack or Hooker’s delay. The standard rate of march back then was 2 miles/hour. However, this standard should not apply here, since this march was certainly forced. Since Hooker’s advance units had about 4 ½ miles to cover before arriving at Chattanooga Creek, is safe to assume that his advance units reached it around noon. The creek was flooded and unfordable. The night before Stevenson, during his retreat from Lookout Mountain to a position next to Cleburne on Tunnel Hill, had burned the bridge. According to Hooker’s report, Osterhaus’s division crossed immediately on the first “stringers” laid of the new bridge. Cozzens writes of a “footbridge” (fn45). While the bridge was being rebuilt Osterhaus covered the 3 additional miles to Rossville and cleared away Clayton’s brigade, thus securing Rossville Gap. He then took some of his forces around the rear of Missionary Ridge along what today is Seminole Dr., and he met no opposition, reaching eventually a point almost directly behind Bragg’s headquarters at around 4:30 PM (fn46) where he was able to capture 2000 Confederates during the general retreat. (See Sherman’s report: “My Osterhaus division did Hooker’s best work.”). Meanwhile the rest of Hooker’s troops were brought across gradually, and finally the artillery crossed the completed bridge as soon as it could bear the weight. Without artillery it would have been folly to commit his entire force against the unknown disposition of Stewart’s troops on Bragg’s left flank (fn47). At some point Geary began attacking Stewart at the western face of the ridge, and Cruft directly attacked the remains of Clayton’s brigade on the ridge. The unit tablets on Missionary Ridge tell the basic story. Two Hooker unit tablets report being “there” (well up on the ridge) at 5 PM. There is no tablet for Osterhaus on Seminole Dr. behind Bragg Reservation. The Stewart’s Division’s tablet at a point .4 of a mile south of Bragg’s headquarters states the following:

“In the afternoon of the Nov. 25th its position was attacked on the left and left rear by Hooker’s command, and in front by the divisions of R.W. Johnson and Sheridan. Being thus compelled to yield position the division retreated toward Ringold.”

According to Thomas’s report Hooker effected the crossing “after 2 p.m.” According to Grant’s report Hooker was delayed “for four hours”. There is a difference here of more than 1 ½ hours, a period which is crucial if the subsequent events at the center of Missionary Ridge are to be understood. For the above named reasons I choose Thomas as the more reliable source.

For a summary of Hooker’s contribution to these events I quote here again from Thomas’s battle report:

“In moving upon Rossville, General Hooker encountered Stewart's division and other troops. Finding his left flank threatened, Stewart attempted to escape by retreating toward Graysville, but some of his force, finding their retreat threatened from that quarter, retired in disorder toward their right, along the crest of the ridge, when they were met by another portion of General Hooker's command, and were driven by these troops in the face of Johnson's division of Palmer's corps, by whom they were nearly all made prisoners.”

The conclusion is inescapable that Grant ordered a limited demonstration with Thomas's men against the center because he hoped only to save the situation for Sherman, regardless of the cost to the army of the Cumberland. Much light would be shed on Grant’s thinking that afternoon if the records of his official correspondence were complete, but they are not. Several key exchanges of the 24th and 25th between Grant and Sherman are missing from the official records (fn31), which leads to further speculation about the possibility that they were suppressed. Someone who is willing to suppress records is also willing to add to them.

There is a further possibility which offers itself if we confront the events on Orchard Knob with my reconstructed time table of Hooker's progress, between which we can see a very close correspondence. If you consider that Hooker's and Stewart’s artillery made noise (fn48), if you consider that Grant repeatedly mentions the noise of Hooker’s battle the day before (only to go strangely silent on the matter in his treatment of the following day), and if you consider that Thomas was in communication with Lookout Mountain (the ultimate observation tower) through signal flag (fn49), and that Thomas states in his official report that on 24 Nov. Hooker had "reported by telegraph" to him, then it is reasonable to assume that both Thomas and Grant were informed of how close Hooker was getting to Stewart. Indeed, Thomas was well-known for his uncanny ability to judge the progress of a battle by sound alone, even when the battle was taking place out of his sight (fn50). Coincidence or not, it is a fact that, the closer Hooker got, the more Grant displayed his concern for Sherman.

Was Grant then willing to sacrifice a good portion of Thomas's army in order to keep the “dangerous” (fn51) Hooker from getting credit for winning the battle?

I am, by the way, willing to listen to other explanations of Grant's behavior, except that he was "foolish" or "hadn't thought the order through". Grant was not foolish, and he had hours and hours to mull the order over before Thomas finally let his troops move forward. Besides, if Grant was foolish, he had no business being there anyway.

A final extant communication from Grant to Sherman on the evening of 25 Nov., not reported by Grant but by the chief signal officer Capt. Ocran Howard reveals Grant’s fidelity until the very end to his original plan (fn52). It also makes a fitting postscript to this battle:

"SHERMAN: Thomas has carried the hill and lot in his immediate front. Now is your time to attack with vigor. Do so. GRANT."

The battle is already over and is as decided as it’s going to be, and Grant makes one last stab at salvaging something for Sherman whose troops are already bivouacking for the night. Sherman’s reply to this message is not recorded (fn53).

Essentially, Thomas's charge up the middle was a well-timed and glorious mopping up operation, and nothing could have pleased Thomas better. That it didn't please Grant is attested to by numerous eye-witness accounts of Grant's anger or even cursing rage as Thomas's troops exceeded his orders (fn19). He didn't need a success on Thomas's part, and he really didn't want Hooker to get any credit. So, after the battle, Grant did the next best thing by rewriting history in both his official report and later in his Memoirs. He redefined Sherman's attack as a successful holding operation, turned Thomas's attack into a miracle (fn54) which he had ordered anyway (but hadn't), and had Hooker disappear into the black hole of Rossville (fn55).

The machine Grant later helped create was in place for decades and in the position to induce the general public to buy this legend (fn56). A large part of the interested public today, including many professional scholars (fn57), still buys at least a portion this legend. However, we don't have to, especially if we let Grant speak for himself who, according to Hooker (true, not the most disinterested of witnesses), said right after the battle: "Damn the battle. I had nothing to do with it" (fn58). Has a nice ring to it, anyway.

As far as the unfortunate Bragg is concerned, the intrigues of Polk, Breckinridge, Hardee, Cheatham, and Longstreet, with Davis's benign connivance, had much reduced the effectiveness of the Army of Tennessee by the time the battle took place. Longstreet's 18,000 men were sorely missed after Longstreet succeeded in getting Davis to order him to Knoxville (in which Bragg all too willingly acquiesced), but Longstreet himself was not missed in Chattanooga by his colleagues, as he through insubordination and indifference had literally thrown away Lookout Valley and thus undermined Bragg's entire left flank. By the way, at Knoxville Burnside (no fool) paid Longstreet back handsomely for Fredericksburg.

When on 23 Nov. (after Thomas's "exploratory" move forward expanded the Federal perimeter to include Orchard Knob) Bragg realized that his position on Missionary Ridge perhaps was not impregnable, he appointed Breckinridge of all people to oversee the work of fortification. An engineer by the name of Captain Green started that very evening in the dark with very few tools and worked all the next day, but, regardless of what all the authors say about this battle, Missionary Ridge has very little military crest with which Captain Green could work, not even with more time allotted to him. In many places it is about 20 yards wide, and much of its western face drops off almost vertically, only to be then divided into innumerable spurs. Cannon could not be decisive up there against a rush, even with elaborate emplacements for them. Instead, Bragg needed men to flesh out the line and to constitute a reserve (fn59), but, with Longstreet's men gone, he could do neither. In addition, Bragg’s men were split between the flats and the crest which impeded the defenders on top of the ridge when the assault started. In any case, he would have been wiser to retreat on the 24th (fn60), and when he didn't, his own troops took matters into their own hands and decided to save their army if Bragg wouldn't.

This brings me back to my point of departure - listening years ago in Bragg Reservation to the quote from Bragg's report about the “shameful conduct” of his veteran troops. That day I sensed that both they and Bragg had seen the "masses of troops" moving toward their hanging left flank and/or the road back home. All including Bragg (regardless of what he wrote in his battle report for consumption in Richmond) knew whither the masses of troops were headed. The trap was closing in on them, and Bragg didn’t have the courage to order retreat. He had collapsed under the weight of his responsibility. Today, after years of reading and reflection, I feel that the knowable facts support my first and intuitive assessment of this battle.

I conclude here with Lincoln’s own assessment of Thomas after the battle of Chickamauga in reply to slanderous comments from “a citizen of New York”:

“It is doubtful whether his heroism and skill exhibited last Sunday afternoon, has ever been surpassed in the world” (fn61). At Chattanooga Thomas surpassed himself, as the above article has attempted to demonstrate.

Acknowledgment and thanks to:

- Jim Ogden of the National Park Service at the Chickamauga Battle Park visitors’ center for providing essential pieces of evidence and documentation;

- Carrington Montague, Mel Young, and Henry Boyd of the “Friends of the Park” in Chattanooga for critically reviewing the rough draft of this paper;

- “Shotgun” for making key battle reports so readily available.

- The staff of the Newnan-Coweta Public Library for invaluable assistance in procuring research material.
.

1. See Bragg’s report of 30 Nov., included here in appendix 6

2. According to Bragg’s report the forces which he first supposed to be moving “to our front” were then reported “far to our left” near the route “open to our rear”. In my opinion the first indication that Hooker was moving “to our front” was for Richmond’s consumption, to avoid the embarrassing question of why Bragg didn’t order a retreat as soon as he saw Hooker start across the valley.

3. Stephen Z. Starr, “Grant and Thomas: December 1864”, Cincinnati Civil War Round Table

4. David Herbert Donald ("Lincoln", Simon & Schuster 1995) describes two inquires Lincoln made about Grant before the convention:

Still [Lincoln] was not yet ready to bring Grant in from West. One reason was that the general was beginning to be talked about as a possible presidential candidate in 1864. He was a favorite of the influential New York Tribune, and, since his political views were unknown, he was wooed by both Democrats and Republicans. With General McClellan conspicuously courting the Democrats, Lincoln was not about to appoint another general-in-chief who had political aspirations. Washburne referred him to J. Russell Jones, a close friend of Grant and his investment adviser, who brought to the White House Grant’s letter pledging that nothing could persuade him to be a candidate for President, particularly since there was the possibility of reelecting Lincoln. “You will never know how gratifying that is to me,” the President said after reading the letter. “No man knows, when that presidential grub gets to gnawing at him, just how deep it will get until he has tried it; and I didn’t know but what there was one gnawing at Grant” (p. 490-91)

And again after the convention (p. 525):

After Lincoln’s nomination, there was still a movement afoot to replace him. Dissidents wanted to call a new convention. “Inevitably reports of these plans reached Lincoln’s ears. He was neither surprised nor worried by most of the schemes to replace him as the nominee of the Republican party, but he was alarmed when he heard that the dissidents were thinking about running Grant. He did not think the general had political aspirations but, concluding that he ought to sound him out again, he asked Colonel John Eaton, who had worked closely with Grant in caring for the freedmen in the Mississippi Valley, to go to the Army of the Potomac and ascertain his views. At City Point, Eaton told Grant that many people thought he ought to run for President, not as a party man but as a citizens’ candidate, in order to save the Union….Grant replied: 'They can’t compel me to do it!…My only desire will be, as it has been, to whip out rebellion in the shortest way possible, and to retain as high a position in the army afterwards as the Administration then in power may think me suitable for.' When Eaton reported the conversation to the President, his relief was obvious. “I told you,” he said, “they could not get him to run until he had closed out the rebellion.”

Robert Leckie, “None Died In Vain” (Harper Perennial 1990), concerning Lincoln's initial inquiry, wrote: "Lincoln was now satisfied, although the phrase 'Administration then in power' suggested to him that the simple soldier from the West might not be as artless as he seemed…” (p. 573).

5. Ambrose Bierce, “A Little of Chickamauga”, Works 1, p. 271-272
“…we knew well enough that there was to be a fight: the fact that we did not want one would have told us that, for Bragg always retired when we wanted to fight and fought when we most desired peace. We had manoeuvered him out of Chattanooga, but had not manoeuvered out entire army into it, and he fell back so sullenly that those of us who followed, keeping him actually in sight, were a good deal more concerned about effecting a junction with the rest of our army than to push the pursuit. By the time that Rosecrans had got his three scattered corps together we were a long way from Chattanooga, with our line of communication with it so exposed that Bragg turned to seize it. Chickamauga was a fight for possession of a road.”

6. Stanley Hirshson, “White Tecumseh”, p. 95

7. Grant’s “Memoirs”, p. 196
“For myself I was little more than an observer. Orders were sent direct to the right wing [Thomas] or reserve, ignoring me…My position was so embarrassing in fact that I made several applications during the siege to be relieved.” This despite Halleck's attempt to calm him down, as in this letter to Grant:

O.R.--SERIES III--VOL II [S# 123] CORRESPONDENCE, REPORTS, ORDERS, etc., FROM APRIL 1 TO DEC. 31, 1862.(*)--#28
GENERAL: Your position, as second in command of the entire forces here in the field, rendered it proper that you should be relieved from the direct charge of either the right wing or the reserve, both of which are mainly composed of your forces. Orders for movements in the field will be sent direct from these headquarters to commanders of army corps, divisions, brigades, or even regiments, if deemed necessary, and you will have no more cause of complaint on that score than others have.
I am very much surprised, general, that you should find any cause of complaint in the recent assignment of commands. You have precisely the position to which your rank entitles you. Had I given you the right wing or reserve only it would have been a reduction rather than increase of command, and I could not give you both without placing you in the position you now occupy.
You certainly will not suspect me of any intention to injure your feelings or reputation or to do you any injustice; if so, you will eventually <ar11_183> change your mind on this subject. For the last three months I have done everything in my power to ward off the attacks which were made upon you. If you believe me your friend you will not require explanations; if not, explanations on my part would be of little avail.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, H. W. HALLECK, Major-general

Consider also Francis McKinney’s assessment (“Education in Violence”, p. 274): “The reasons for Thomas’ aloofness have never been revealed. Personal relations between the two had been strained during the Corinth campaign and seemed to have worsened since. Thomas’ feeling was so marked that it was adopted by his staffs the model for their official relations with Grant’s headquarters. As a result, transactions between the two chiefs-of-staff deteriorated in several instances to personal rudeness. Friendly cooperation between the staffs was never established.”

7.5. In this I go only a little bit further than Governor Brownlow who, upon presenting Thomas a gold medal offered him by the Tennessee legislature on the 2nd anniversery of the battle of Nashville said: "General, in no spirit of flattery, I must be permitted to say, that in the great struggle of four years, which recently convulsed the Nation, of all military commanders, you are perhaps the only one that never lost a battle, and in the government of armies and departments never made a mistake." T. van Horne, "Life of Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas", p. 416

8. “Battles and Leaders of the Civil War”, W.F. Smith’s Comments on General Grant’s “Chattanoga” vol. 3, p. 714
“…there is not the slightest reason for doubting that Thomas would have made the same move with the same men and with the same results had General Grant been in Louisville…” And indeed Thomas could do it alone. Francis McKinney writes in "Education in Violence" on p. 279: "Thomas' solution of his supply problem, which seems simple enough in retrospect, impressed his associates. Grant, who felt the situation to be impossible, Dana, who reported that the Army of the Cumberland balanced on the knife edge of disaster, and Sherman, who had no idea that things could be so bad, watched Thomas bring order out of chaos" [italics mine].

9. Francis McKinney, “Education in Violence”, p. 302
“Grant seemed uninterested in the staff work that smoothes the way for combat activity.”

10. Many authors retell the anecdote originating from James H. Wilson (Grant’s then inspector general) that Thomas snubbed Grant at his arrival in Chattanooga after a difficult trip over Walden’s Ridge. Instead of immediately offering Grant dry clothes, Thomas let Grant sit for a while in front of the fire while a puddle formed underneath him from his wet clothes. For some Grant apologists this incident was the basis for all of Grant’s future persecution of Thomas.

11. Horace Porter, "Campaigning with Grant", pp. 3-5
"As soon as general Grant had partaken of a light supper immediately after his arrival, General Thomas had sent for several general officers and most of the members of his staff to come to headquarters, and the room soon contained an exceedingly interesting group. A member of General Thomas's staff quietly called that officer's attention to the fact that the distinguished guest's clothes were pretty wet and his boots were thoroughly soaked with rain after his long ride through the storm, and intimated that colds were usually no respecters of persons [italics]. General Thomas's mind had been so intent upon receiving the commander, and arranging for a conference of officers, that he had entirely overlooked his guest's travel-stained condition; but as soon as his attention was called to it, all of his old-time Virginia hospitality was aroused, and he at once begged his newly arrived chief to step into a bedroom and change his clothes. His urgings, however, were in vain. The general thanked him politely, but positively declined [italics mine] to make any additions to his personal comfort, except to light a fresh cigar. Afterward, however, he consented to draw his chair nearer to the wood fire which was burning in the chimney-place, and to thrust his feet forward to give his top-boots a chance to dry."

12. “Battles and Leaders”, vol. 3, p. 715-716

13. In fact a flanking movement around the northern end of the ridge was made, but not by any troops under Sherman, but rather by Wilder’s cavalry under Thomas. In his order of 18 Nov. to Sherman (quoted in Grant’s battle report) there is a cryptic mention of a brigade of cavalrymen which was to be “thrown across the Tennessee above Chickamauga and may be able to make the trip to Cleveland [halfway between Chattanooga and Knoxville] or thereabouts.” McKinney on p. 292 mentions “Thomas’ cavalry which was wrecking Bragg’s communications further off to the north and east.” I find this further corroborated in Sam Watkins “C. Aytch”, p. 100 . Watkins and Sgt. Tucker were on picket duty opposite the mouth of N. Chickamauga Creek. A Yankee waded over to swap “a few lies, canteens, and tobacco”. “That man was General Wilder, commanding the Federal Cavalry, and at the battle of Missionary Ridge he threw his whole division of cavalry across the Tennessee River at that point, thus flanking Bragg’s army, and opening the battle. He was examining the ford, and the swapping business was but a mere by-play. He played it sharp, and Bragg had to get further.” Although this story is apocryphal (since Wilder was on sick leave from the army at the time because of typhoid), it is still worth retelling.

14. Peter Cozzens, “Shipwreck of Their Hopes”, p. 241

15. McKinney, 295
“Historians seem to be unanimous in the belief that the order to the Fourth and Fourteenth corps were to halt and await further orders after they had taken the rifle pits at the base of the Ridge. There is no doubt that this was the understanding of Grant, Granger, and Wood. In addition there is the eye-witness testimony of Gen. Joseph Fullerton (“Battles and Leaders” vol. 3, p. 724): ‘The only order given was to move forward and take the rifle -pits at the foot of the ridge.’”

16. Grant’s “Memoirs”, p. 339
“But Sherman’s condition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief could not be delayed any longer.”

17. O.R.-- SERIES I--VOL. XXXI/2 [S# 55] NOV. 23-27, 1863.--The Chattanooga-Ringgold Campaign. No. 4

18. Cozzens, p. 391:
“[Grant] never satisfactorily explained his foolish order to Thomas to seize only the rifle pits at the base of Missionary Ridge. Instead Grant chose to lie. In both his report of the battle and his memoirs, he insisted that he had given Thomas express authority to carry the ridge itself, and implied that he fully expected that to be done. General Thomas died just four years after the war, and in any case was not the sort to engage in egotistical bickering. Few chose to dispute Grant’s version of events while Grant lived.”

19. The question of the extent of Grant’s surprise, dismay, anger, or rage as the 4th and 14th corps continued up the ridge after taking the rifle pits would alone be the topic of a scholarly article. Suffice it to mention here that many eyewitnesses give testimony that Grant definitely did not want Thomas’s men to make that charge. I mention here Fullerton (B & L, vol. 3, p. 725), Charles Brigham of the New York Tribune (Hirshson, p. 174), and Thomas Wood (“The battle of Missionary Ridge”, p. 42) whom I quote here: “This statement of General Grant is absolutely refuted by the anger displayed by him (which display was witnessed by many living men, and has been publicly attested by several responsible witnesses) when he saw my division commence the assault of Missionary Ridge, accompanied by the breathing out of threatenings and slaughter, against myself especially if the assault failed…If General Grant intended the assault of the crest of the Ridge to follow immediately on the heels of the initial success, he certainly kept that intention to himself.”

20. For ex.: Broadfoot’s supplements to the Official Records, Vol. 6, p. 129, report of Capt. W.B. Scott:
Under attack from the West [by Johnson] Stewart’s line held. “No one seemed to dream of being driven from our position…When we felt that all was safe they had broken our lines on our left, and ere we knew it, we were flanked and fired upon from the rear [by Osterhaus].”

21. Walter H. Hebert "Fighting Joe Hooker", p. 297
He cites as his authority for this William Baldy Smith in “An Historical Sketch of the Military Operations Around Chattanooga, Tennessee, September 22 to November 27, 1863,” Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, VIII.245.

22. McKinney, p. 295

23. O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXI/2 [S# 55] NOVEMBER 23-27, 1863.--The Chattanooga-Ringgold Campaign.
No. 62.--Report of Brig. Gen. August Willich, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade.:
“At 11 a.m. I received an order to prepare for an advance, and to advance toward Missionary Ridge at the signal of six rapid cannon shots. I understand since that the order was given to take only the rifle-pits at the foot of the ridge; by what accident, I am unable to say, I did not understand it so; I only understood the order to advance”.

24. Maj. James Connelly, “Three Years in the Army of the Cumberland”, p. 156

25. Cozzens, p. 247 (based upon OR  31, pt. 2, 68, 116 and accounts by Wilson, High, Fullerton, and Roper)
At about 3:00 Grant sharply said: “General Thomas, order Granger to turn that battery over to its proper commander and take command of his own corps. And now order your troops to advance and take the enemy’s first line of rifle pits.”

26. McKinney, p. 284

27. Bruce Catton, “Grant Takes Command”, p. 499

28. Catton, p. 81

29. O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXI/2 [S# 55] NOVEMBER 23-27, 1863.--The Chattanooga-Ringgold Campaign. No. 32.--Report of Col. Jason Marsh, Seventy-fourth Illinois Infantry.

30. O.R.- SERIES I--VOL.  XXXI/2 [S# 55] NOV. 23-27, 1863.-The Chattanooga-Ringgold Campaign. No. 4.

31. Sword, p. 201:
“This crucial message is missing from the reported official communications. Also, it appears further dispatches between Sherman and Grant similarly were not reported. A mysterious gap occurs in communications to and from these generals from November 24 to midday on November 25 (with two exceptions), despite the reference by signal officers to active communications during this critical period (OR 31-2-42,44,597).”

32. Sherman, “Memoirs”, p. 361

33. Sherman, “Memoirs”, p. 361

34. O.R.-- SERIES I--VOL. XXXI/2 [S# 55] NOV. 23-27, 1863.--The Chattanooga-Ringgold Campaign. No. 4. --:
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., November 24, 1863--6 p.m. (Received 4 a.m., 25th.)
“Major-General HALLECK: The fight to-day progressed favorably. Sherman carried the end of Missionary Ridge, and his right is now at the tunnel, and left at Chickamauga Creek. Troops from Lookout Valley carried the point of the mountain, and now hold the eastern slope ann [sic] point high up. I cannot yet tell the amount of casualties, but our loss is not heavy. Hooker reports 2,000 prisoners taken, besides which a small number have fallen into our hands from Missionary Ridge.” U.S. GRANT, Major-General.

35. OR, Series I-volume 31, part II-reports, p. 75. In addition Gen. O.O.Howard has this to say in a report about the railroads as he found them in his sector: "From the map it will be noticed that the Atlanta railroad, passing south of Fort Wood, runs northeast nearly parallel with the river. The East Tennessee railroad, passing north of Fort Wood, crosses the other before entering the tunnel through Mission Ridge. My line cut both these roads, and its left rested just across the Citico on the river." (O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXI/2 [S# 55], p 348)

36. Atlas to Accompany the OR, series I, vol. 31, part 2, page 27

37. Ambrose Bierce, “George Thurston”, Stories, 369
“Whether in camp or on the march, in barracks, in tents, or en bivouac, my duties as a topographical engineer kept me working like a beaver - all day in the saddle and half the night at my drawing table, platting my surveys. It was hazardous work; the near to the enemy’s lines I could penetrate, the more valuable were my field notes and the resulting maps. It was a business in which the lives of men counted as nothing against the chance of defining a road or sketching a bridge.”

38. McKinney, p. 279, Piatt and Boynton, p. 474

39. McKinney, pp. 274-5
“James H. Wilson, Grant’s inspector general, wrote about Thomas: ‘And later, when I came to know him better, he not only confirmed the impression of perfect self-reliance he gave me on that occasion, but made it clear that the need of supervision from any source had never presented itself to his mind.’”

40. Cozzens, p. 392. See also W.F. Smith’s assessment of Grant’s treatment 20 years later of the battle and Thomas in “Battles & Leaders”, vol. 3, p. 715
“General Grant’s narrative [in his “Memoirs”] is in text and inference so unjust to the memory of the late Major-General George H. Thomas that is proper to make a statement of facts taken in the main from official papers."

41. Cozzens, pp. 246-247

42. Sword, p. 257

43. O.R.-- SERIES I--VOL. XXXI/2 [S# 55] NOV. 23-27, 1863.--The Chattanooga-Ringgold Campaign.No. 9.--:
WHITE HOUSE, LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN, November 25, 1863--9.20 a.m.
"Major-General REYNOLDS: Have regiment on Summertown road; one on summit of Lookout. Enemy reported picketing Chattanooga Creek. They appear to be burning camps in valley. I await orders [italics mine]. JOSEPH HOOKER"

44. Sword, p. 232

45. Cozzens, p. 245

46. This is an extrapolation from other information. Osterhaus had to be in place there at about this time in order to intercept the Confederates fleeing from Cruft’s attack.

47. It is a matter of record what happened when Hooker attempted to rush Ringgold Gap on 27 Nov. while his artillery was still behind the burned bridge over Chickamauga Creek. Hooker certainly should have used more caution here, but he was under pressure to pursue a beaten enemy. When Sheridan sent his men into a trap in the darkness of the evening of 25 Nov. he was praised for his aggressiveness and was later promoted and, later still, allowed to try his hand at pursuing trapped Indian families. Consider here Dana’s treatment of the Ringgold Gap affair (O.R.-- SERIES I--VOL. XXXI/2 [S# 55]NOV. 23-27, 1863):
Yesterday the first great fault in this admirable campaign occurred at this place…It was a very dangerous defile to attack in front, and common sense plainly dictated that it should be turned. This could be done without difficulty by way of White Oak Ridge, which can be passed with ease in many places, while Taylor's Ridge is steeper, though infinitely easier to go over, than Missionary Ridge at Chattanooga. However, Hooker attacked in front, and the result was officially reported by him last night in the loss of 500 killed and wounded, where there was no necessity of losing 50. Having been <ar55_71> repulsed in his first attempt Hooker tried to turn the position, but in this blundered yet worse, for he sent his troops through the nearest gap in White Oak Ridge, not more than half a mile distant from the gorge, where the movement was fully visible to the enemy, and where they had time to prepare a destructive cross-fire, which made this attack quite as fatal as the former. Having thus failed in this flank movement, in which the Twelfth Missouri lost nearly all its officers, he sent Geary's troops again at the front, and finally carried it by Geary's New York regiments. RINGGOLD ,November 28, 1863--8 a.m. [C. A. DANA.]

48. O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXIX/2 [S# 49]: “CHATTANOOGA, November 25, 1863--1 p.m.
"Rebels just opened artillery in that direction, apparently at his column. In our front here rebel rifle-pits are fully manned, preventing Thomas gaining ridge. [C. A. DANA.]"

49. O.R.-- SERIES I--VOL. XXXI/2 [S# 55]NOV. 23-27, 1863.--The Chattanooga-Ringgold Campaign. No. 9.--:
SIGNAL STATION OPPOSITE SOUTH CHICKAMAUGA, Nov. 25, 1863--9 a.m.
"Communication has just been opened with Lookout, and message to General Hooker sent. MERRILL."

50. McKinney, p. 100
“On July 2 [1861, before the battle of 1st Manassas]…Thomas surprised his subordinates by accurately interpreting, from the sound of the firing, what was happening on the skirmish line out of range of his vision.”

51. Grant’s “Memoirs”, p. 581-582:
“…[Hooker’s] achievement in bringing his command around the point of Lookout Mountain and into Chattanooga Valley was brilliant. I nevertheless regarded him as a dangerous man. He was not subordinate to his superiors. He was ambitious to the extent of caring nothing for the rights of others.”

52. O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXI/2 [S# 55] (OR 31-2-596,650)

53. Sword, p. 260

54. Grant in his after battle report of 23 Dec. 1963 describes the unfathomable in this fashion: “I can account for this only on the theory that the enemy’s surprise at the audacity of such a charge caused confusion and purposeless aiming of their pieces.” Grant could leave it up to Dana and others to expressly use the word “miracle”.

55. The very OR Atlas map (mentioned above) which Grant attached to his battle report tells the entire story. The credits to the mapmakers in the bottom right hand corner, surrounded by a large white area, cover the battlefield almost up to Rossville. Grant doesn’t place a single Hooker unit at the southern end of Missionary Ridge.

56. McKinney, p. 304:
“What came to be known as the Grant Legend grew up around the series of battles which he fought for the possession of Chattanooga. The impression was planted that it was the unique battle of the war, planned from beginning to end and fought as planned, and that Grant’s own army of the Tennessee played the dominant role and led the way to victory. The Legend was conceived in the battle reports of Grant and Sherman. Campaign literature devised to elect and re-elect Grant to the Presidency made full use of it. Some of Grant’s unscrupulous biographers sought to rivet it into history. Undoubtedly similar legends grow up around all great military leaders. The only point to be made about this one is that it downgraded Thomas to upgrade Grant and Sherman. It was done subtly at first. There was no denial of the fact that Thomas had initiated and implemented the changes in the battle plans nor was it denied that the Cumberlanders usurped the major role on the twenty-fifth. But there began an official campaign to label Thomas as a sluggard which became strident and outspoken after his death.”

57. Shelby Foote gives us a perfect example of this on page 850 of vol. 2 of his book "The Civil War, a Narrative" where he relates that Hooker was "delayed some four hours" at Chattanooga Creek, thus demonstrating "Fighting Joe's ineptness". Sound familiar?

58. Freeman Cleaves, “Rock of Chickamauga, p. OR, vol 31, pt. 2, 69. Morris, “All Hell Can’t Stop Them", 40.

59. Cozzens, p. 390
“What sealed the Confederate fate on Missionary Ridge…was the absence of a strong, mobile reserve with which to plug gaps along the ridge.”

60. The evening of 24 Nov. Hardee counseled retreat, Breckinridge advised Bragg to stay and fight.

61. McKinney, p. 271, David Bates, “Lincoln in the Telegraph Office", 1907, p. 169

62. Cozzens, p. 210:
Corse in trouble sent back Col. Jones to Sherman to advise against the attack against Swett’s battery. Sherman replied: “Go back and make that charge immediately; time is everything.”