♦Dick from the Netherlands writes:
What I admire in your approach to the war is that you take nothing for granted and this leads often, I think, to new insights, certainly you make all the generals appear as ordinary people. May I ask these questions:
Are the people of the Southern States nowadays sorry that they lost the war?
Are Grant and Sherman bad generals because they did terrible things that brought the war to an end?
Was McClellan a bad general because he had feelings for his men?

Joe Ryan replies: 
The first question: No, I hardly think so; they are certainly proud of their region's past and proud of their ancestors, but they, like the rest of us Americans, recognize the great inheritance they gained from the Civil War—making America, through Union, a great force for good in the world when not misguided by selfish men. The second and third questions: assuming you mean "good" in the moral sense, as opposed to the professional, Grant and his sidekick, Sherman, commanded by Lincoln, were the first modern generals to impose the ravages of war on a country's civilian population, a precedent that America followed to a most horrible degree in the Second World War. But they did not commit genocide; kill women and children, or civilian males indiscriminately. So it's hard, I suppose, to label either of them morally wrong in their conduct as generals. As for George McClellan, he was a bad general in the professional sense, because unable to stomach the horror of war he caused his soldiers more harm than good.

♦Ken writes:
Lee was obligated by oath to defend the United States against those who would break the Union. His act was treason.

Joe Ryan replies: 
The English language of the oath of allegiance the government framed for Lee to sign, in 1855, cannot reasonably be interpreted to support your statement that Lee "was obligated to defend the United States against those who would break the Union." If you have an oath that does contain language reasonably susceptible to the meaning you claim for it, and which you can show Lee signed, produce it and we will be pleased to publish it.

♦Ken responds:
Perhaps your argument is correct; that is, how Lee saw it. Clearly the Union is essential as the basis of our government.

Joe Ryan replies:
Clearly the Union is essential to our security. As the lyric reads, "We are fools to make war on our brothers-in-arms."

♦Gerald comments:
I believe the Civil War could have been won by the South if they had taken the offensive earlier in the war. Also, was Jefferson Davis an effective leader? Your thoughts please.

Joe Ryan replies:
The evidence suggests that the South had no real chance of winning the war Lincoln instigated. The Southern politicians, who orchestrated secession in their states, Jefferson Davis included, were gambling that the people of the loyal states would not support a Union policy of war. Once Lincoln manipulated events to cause the loyal states to support his war against secession, the only possibility of the South "winning the war" turned on whether or not England would use its naval power to keep the sea lanes open to Southern ports. When this did not materialize secession was doomed. The ultimate proof of this, is shown by the objective inability of Jefferson Davis's government to produce enough men and material to permit Joe Johnston and Pierre Beauregard, after the battle of Bull Run, to move into Maryland and challenge the Union army for possession of Washington. I think Jefferson Davis did as good a job in his office as Lincoln did in his.

♦Buzz Queen writes::
What about "State Rights" and Abolitionism?

♦Don from New Orleans writes::
If racism was the cause and reason for the War of Northern Aggression then why did the underground railroad go to Canada and not any of the northern states?

♦Robert Naranda writes:
Dear Mr. Ryan
After reading the first line I realize you are a subjective writer and it would be a waste of time to continue.

♦ Laura writes to say:
What has racism got to do with the genesis of the Civil War? The war was between two completely different economic cultures: the largely industrial North levying high taxes against the agrarian South. By 1860, the families that owned slaves had fallen to about 12% of the population; by the end of the war it was less than half that number. Most slave holders owned only one or two slaves as they were expensive. A healthy young male might cost $1,000, and you could buy a 500 acre farm for that.

As far as the harsh oppression of the “natives” thousands died of disease, infection, and war before the first landing of Europeans to North America.

Keep in mind that, too, that at one time the North owned slaves and that many Northern states told Lincoln that no freed slaves would be allowed to reside or work in their states after the Emancipation Proclamation was put into effect.

Please do not insult the intelligence of those who know the truth of the causes and effects of the Civil War. Revisionist history is also racist.

Joe Ryan replies: 
Thank you for your comment. You express some abstract ideas that seem to lack a coherent connection; indeed they contradict your point that “racism” had nothing to do with the “cause” of the American Civil War.

♦Laura remarks:
In other words: “You are a stupid female who has no clue about what I wrote so how dare you question my brilliance.” Is that what you mean?

Joe Ryan replies: 
Your name hardly makes a difference, had it been Bill you would have received the same reply. It seems clear to me that the issue with you is white racism. You wish to defend the white race for enslaving Africans and Indians, and you offer abstractions to do that.

For example, you support your thesis with the statement that, in fact, the United States, in 1860, was divided by “two completely different economic cultures.” The point being that this fact explains the cause of the Civil War? It is, of course, true, that the States above the Mason-Dixon line, States which once in fact supported slavery, were committed to free labor, while the States below the line were committed to slave labor. My point simply is that both sides of the line understood completely that the idea of slavery as the basis of an economic system was way, way past its prime. That, in fact, people, whatever their color, were entitled to be free.

In the ordinary political course of abolishing slavery, then, the white people of the North should be expected to accept Africans as their social and political equals, that both might live side by side; and in that way the blacks would be assimilated fairly into the society of the whites. But, the North did not offer the South a fair way out; on the contrary, as you acknowledge, the North sought to shut the blacks up in the South. The North insisted that Slavery be gone, but that the erstwhile slaves stay where they were, in the South.

So the people of the South understood that it was they, not their counterparts in the North, who were the ones that had to live in social and political equality with the Africans, which in some states meant that the Africans would dominate the whites. That being the case, war made some sense.

Deb of Texas writes: I recently heard a distinguished author/speaker at our round table say General Lee went to Gettysburg strictly to forage for his army. I had never heard that. I am wondering what your thoughts are on this.

Joe Ryan replies: Take a look at the videos displayed on the website, under Joe Ryan's Battlewalks, Approaches to Gettysburg and Gettysburg The Second Day. They answer your question the long way. My short answer to the speaker's statement that General Lee went to Pennsylvania to forage, is that it is silly.

Of course Lee's army appropriated anything that could be moved—livestock, wagons, harness, tools, horseshoes, clothing, flour, grain, and money—but the caloric value of the food products gained by the foraging was plainly cancelled out by the calories expended by the men and animals not only marching to and from Gettysburg but also in fighting a horrific battle there. Even assuming that the speaker offered some objective evidence of the fact that the army gained a substantial surplus in the exchange, the surplus cannot possibly justify in terms of military science, much less in terms of Confederate war policy, Lee's marching his army to Gettysburg and fighting there the battle that determined the fate of Virginia, and with it the fate of the Confederacy.

Oh but the battle simply happened by accident during the course of the foraging, the speaker might say. In other words, from the start (which means from Fredericksburg on the Rappahannock) Lee meant to march his army of 80,000 men and 20,000 animals in a two hundred mile loop because he expected to gain for it more food than it would consume. Simply ridiculous.

Tim, a descendent of a soldier in the 44th Alabama Regiment at Gettysburg, inquires, regarding the battle’s first day: How did Edward Johnson’s division of Ewell’s corps manage to get to Gettysburg eight hours late in the first place? In other words, what route was he ordered to take and by whom?

Joe Ryan replies: The answer must depend upon reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts established by the evidence. In his battle report, Johnson expressly states: “On June 29, in obedience to orders, I countermarched my division to Greenville, thence via Scotland, to Gettysburg, not arriving in time, however to participate in the battle of the 1st.” Richard Ewell. in his report, states merely this: “I. . . was starting on the 29th for [Harrisburg] when ordered by [Lee] to join the main body of the army at Cashtown, near Gettysburg.”

It is an undisputed fact that, on the morning of the 29th, Johnson’s division was strung along the road between Carlisle and Shippensburg, and that between Johnson and Rodes’s division was the corps trains. In complying with the order he states came to him somehow from Lee, Ewell had to decide whether to have the trains and Johnson’s division follow Rodes down the east side of the South Mountain toward Cashtown, or have Johnson and the trains move south down the west side of the South Mountain to the road between Cashtown and Chambersburg; or, in the alternative, have Johnson take the trains, on the road between Shippensburg and Arndtsville, over the table top of the South Mountain.

Since we have nothing in evidence that is credible concerning what exact instructions Lee actually communicated to Ewell, and precisely when, we must base our judgment of the reason for Johnson’s late arrival on the fact that Ewell probably ordered Johnson to march south, ignore the road from Shippensburg to Arndtsville, and cut into the road from Chambersburg leading to Cashtown. It was the taking of this route that caused Johnson’s division to arrive on the field too late.

Tim also offers the observation that, in his view, Lee at Gettysburg was gambling on a one shot winner-take-all-attempt to end the war in Pennsylvania.

Joe Ryan replies: I don’t think so. General Lee had designed a classic “encounter” battle that was intended to crush a piece of the enemy’s army, throwing that piece back, inducing the enemy to retreat to the natural line of defense offered by Pipe Creek. In this projected scenario, as the enemy was assuming the defensive at the Pipe Creek line, Lee intended to march his army south on the Emmittsburg road, turning the Pipe Creek line, which would have caused the enemy to continue their retrograde movement closer to Washington, perhaps falling back into its forts, in which case Lee would occupy Frederick and then advance. General Lee hoped in this way to bring his army up to the Washington forts on the 4th of July. Then, most certainly, he would have warmly embraced the gamble of a winner-take-all struggle for possession of the Union Capital. In such case, the concurrent fall of Vicksburg to Grant would have been irrelevant.

Tony Wood of England remarks:
I am a family lawyer from England and have visited Gettysburg several times now. I agree with your view of Ewell's performance. As you walk Culp's Hill you realize how crucial it was and yet the historians seem to still dwell on Cemetery Ridge. I think you are right that Jackson probably would have taken the hill and that the tide of the encounter would have washed closer to Washington.

Joe Ryan replies: Yes, the historians and Civil War writers dwell on Cemetery Ridge; I think the reason is that romance sells books, and there is the problem of breaking loose from the herd—the silly story line of the battle happening by accident and that Meade was actually in danger of losing his army in the struggle. These people are lazy, working in a profession where the digging deep into primary sources is apparently deemed to be beneath them.

Nicholas Hollis writes:
At the General Longstreet Recognition Project (link), we have been seeking to establish some objective truth in relation to Longstreet's actions on the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg, and appreciate the clarity your Gettysburg videos offer on the subject.

Joe Ryan replies: The historical myth of the Battle of Gettysburg is now so seeped in the literature—literature layered by generations of writers repeating the story line—that it will probably take another 150 years to get the public's mind aligned to the objective truth of the matter. It seems to me the story line probably developed out of the politics of professional historians, from both sides of the Mason-Dixon Line.

The Cause of the Civil War