Doris Kearns Goodwin, in her 2005 biography of Abraham Lincoln, Team of Rivals, gives the standard story that has been told by history teachers to students, for generations. In between informing us what Lincoln ate for breakfast, how well he slept at night, and how often he exercised,  Goodwin lays down the story that Lincoln intended that a squadron of naval ships force entry into Charlestown Harbor, followed by soldiers manning tugboats, to reinforce Fort Sumter. But the mission was not executed because Lincoln bungled the plan. Lincoln, Goodwin writes, “had failed to peruse the orders carefully and inadvertently assigned the Powhatan (a 2,000 ton side wheel steamer carrying 20 guns) simultaneously to both Pickens and Sumter.” Goodwin supports her conclusion by claiming “it was not unusual for Lincoln to sign documents from Seward without reading them.” (See, Team of Rivals at pp. 340-346)

Goodwin dismisses the contrary assertion that Lincoln didn’t bungle anything, that instead he had caused the mission to be carried out just as he had intended. “Critics” she writes, (of Lincoln? Of the war?) “later claimed that Lincoln had maneuvered the South into beginning the war. In fact, he had simply followed his (off she goes in search of a hook) inaugural pledge that he would `hold’ the properties belonging to the government, `but beyond what may be necessary’ to accomplish this, `there will be no invasion—no using force.’ . . . Had Lincoln chosen to abandon the fort, he would have violated his pledge to the north. Had he used force in any way other than to `hold’ government properties, he would have breached his promise to the South.”

What silliness is this? Who cares what Lincoln “promised” four weeks earlier in his inaugural “pledge?” Now, in April 1861, the fact of the matter was that the southern section of the country was no longer in the Union, but without the Union, and Lincoln had made himself absolutely clear in his inaugural address that, in that event, he would marshal the military forces of the Union to subjugate the South. By April 1861, the problem for him was how to incite the Northern people (made up of millions of Democrats) to respond to his extra-legal call for volunteers to form an army to invade the South.

When Lincoln came into office on March 8, 1861, he knew it was practically impossible for the U.S. Navy to penetrate Charleston Harbor and reinforce Fort Sumter. The feat might have been accomplished four months earlier, while Buchanan was still president, but now, in April 1861, the Confederates had built a substantial array of batteries on all points of land surrounding Fort Sumter and had battery platforms on the waters ringing the fort. No navy ship of the line could expect to survive the artillery storm that would fall on it as it came across the bar and entered the harbor. In addition, fire ships would most certainly be sailed down upon it and there would be booms of barriers across the mouth of the harbor blocking entrance.

During Buchanan’s last days in office, the son-in-law of Montgomery Blair, Gustavas V. Fox, had approached Buchanan’s cabinet with a paper plan to effect the reinforcement of Fort Sumter. The plan called for steamships to carry troops, munitions and sustenance supplies down to Charleston. The steamers would also carry whale boats. Tugboats would follow the steamers and naval war ships would also be present to provide covering fire. Once all these vessels were to collect outside the harbor mouth, at night, and with the tide, the soldiers would occupy the whaleboats, and the tugboats would tow strings of them into the harbor and around to the fort’s wharf, where the soldiers would disembark and enter the fort.

This plan was rejected by Buchanan. Instead a single civilian steamer was sent, with notice given to the Confederates that the ship carried food supplies only. The steamer—The Star of the West—did enter the harbor, but was forced to make a U-turn under heavy fire from the shore batteries and the danger of fire ships crashing into it.

Given the military facts of the situation, no reasonable person standing in Lincoln’s shoes, in April 1861, could have entertained intelligently, the idea of adopting Fox’s plan for use against South Carolina. Most importantly, if Fox’s plan had been adopted and executed, then Lincoln’s government would have been viewed, both domestically and internationally, as the military aggressor, the attacker, and South Carolina as the defender of its sovereign territory. Such a perception certainly would not have had the effect Lincoln needed; Lincoln needed to change political opinion one hundred and eighty degrees from the view taken by Horace Greeley of the New York Tribune (a main stay radical Republican) that there was no point in the Union pinning the South to it by the bayonet!. That it was better for the Union to let it go. That is exactly what Lincoln, from Day One, meant to do: Pin the South to the Union with the bayonet. Can Ms. Goodwin deny this was Lincoln’s original intent? Can any rational person deny this?

Welles states the political climate of the time: “Neither party (Republican or Democrat) appeared to be apprehensive of or to realize the gathering storm. There was a general belief, indulged in by most persons, that an adjustment would in some way be brought about, without any extensive resort to extreme measures. . .  the great body of the people . . . were incredulous as to any extensive, serious disturbance.”

Then, how, in riling the country to war, was Lincoln to turn on its head, the perception that his government was the aggressor? How to make it seem that South Carolina was the aggressor and that Lincoln’s government was merely defending itself from such aggression. How, in other words, to prod South Carolina into bombarding the fort without, apparently, any provocation?

No sooner had Lincoln assumed the executive office but he was off and running with a plan to do this. He accomplished the plan by creating the appearance, in the minds of the Confederates, that he had issued orders that circumstances confirmed were being carried out, to send U.S. Naval warships to Charlestown, to force an entrance into the harbor.

The first witness to this is Gideon Wells. In 1909 a three volume book appeared on the market, entitled Diary of Gideon Welles. The book was put together by Welles’s son, Edgar T. Welles.  The book was represented to be based on a hand-written diary that Welles kept during his tenure in Lincoln’s cabinet; except for the first chapter.  As to the first chapter, Edgar Welles wrote in a footnote: “This first chapter is not a part of Mr. Welles’s diary, having been written several years after the events narrated,” and before Welles actually began to keep a diary. The son does not state who wrote the chapter; presumably it was Welles himself, or precisely when it was written and why.

Lincoln’s Situation.

On March 5, 1861, commissioners from the Confederate government arrived in Washington and began communicating with William Seward, the Secretary of State. They were there to negotiate with Lincoln, the idea being to establish a treaty between the Union and the Confederacy. In the course of these communications they pressed for the garrisons at Pensacola, Florida, and Charleston Harbor to be evacuated from Forts Pickens and Sumter. Lincoln refused to meet with them, but allowed Seward to string them along through the month of March and into early April. Seward’s several messages promised that eventually he would persuade Lincoln to order the evacuations.

According to Welles’s account, two days after Lincoln’s inauguration, Welles was informed by General Scott, the general-in-chief of the U.S. Army at the time, of “the formidable obstacles which were to be encountered from the numerous and well-manned batteries that were erected in Charleston Harbor. Any successful attempt to reinforce or relieve the garrison by sea Scott supposed impractical.”

The next day, Welles and Scott met with Lincoln at the White House and Scott repeated his opinion. According to Welles’s story, the “President. . . was adverse to any offensive measures.  . . to forbear giving offense.” Lincoln at this meeting ordered Scott to prepare a position statement on Sumter and report back.

Lincoln Plays It Close To The Vest.

At this point, Welles relates, Lincoln established the practice of not inviting all cabinet members to meetings. Between March 4, 1861 and April 1861, Lincoln held the ribbons leading to each minister in his hands, but each minister was in the dark regarding what was happening in the departments of the other ministers. In other words, he kept the right hand from knowing what the left hand was doing. Only William Seward, Lincoln’s secretary of state, seemed to be in Lincoln’s total confidence although, from the evidence, that is far from certain. As Welles stated it, “The Secretary of State was apprised of every meeting. . . The President had only to send word to the State Department (Seward) at any time, day or night, when he wanted to call his cabinet together, or any portion of them

. . . “

In the middle of March, at Lincoln’s direction, G. V. Fox went to Sumter to confer with Major Anderson commanding the garrison. Anderson told Fox, forcing a way in to the harbor was not practical. But when Fox returned, Welles states, “The President accepted the services of Fox. . . , the object being the relief of the garrison and the supplies and troops for reinforcement being from the army, the expedition was a military one and not a naval one, but with naval aid and cooperation.”

Welles tells us his understanding of Fox’s plan. “The transports which the War Department was to charter were to rendezvous off Charleston with naval (war) vessels. . . The steam frigate Powhatan. . . had just arrived (at Brooklyn Naval Yard), and the crew discharged the day before the final decision of the President was communicated. Dispatches were sent. . . directing that the Powhatan be fitted without delay for service. The  Pawnee, Pocahantas, and the Harriet Lane, were ordered (by Welles) to be in readiness for sea service on or before April 6. These orders were given on March 30^th.” (The Harriet Lane was at the Washington Naval Yard, the Pawnee and Pocahantas were at Norfolk Naval Yard.)

Confusion Occurs In Welles’s Mind

On April 1, 1861, Welles writes, he was startled to learn that Lt. David D. Porter of the Navy and Captain Meigs of  the Army were writing letters and orders for Lincoln’s signature than dealt with the massing of military forces at Pensacola, Florida. He went immediately to the White House and confronted Lincoln, he says; his complaint being that as he was secretary of the navy such matters should be handled by him. Welles reports Lincoln’s response as this: Lincoln claimed total surprise, saying that he didn’t have any knowledge what was going on, that “Seward, with two or three young men (Porter and Meigs being two) had been there through the day on a subject which Seward had in hand . . . that it was Seward’s speciality, to which he, the President, had yielded, but as it involved considerable details, he had left Seward to prepare the necessary papers. These papers he had signed, many of them without reading (this is where Goodwin gets her basis).” “These young men,” Lincoln said, Welles claims, “were here as clerks to write down [Seward’s] plans and orders.”

Lincoln Deflects Welles’s Eyes

So, now, as of April 1, we have two distinct expeditions being planned, one by Lincoln, to be put in motion by Welles, and one delegated by Lincoln to Seward to put in motion. Lincoln’s expedition, supposedly to be led by G.V. Fox, was set for Charleston while Seward’s mission, to be led by Lt. Porter and Meigs, was set for Pensacola.

The Welles book then asks, “What, then, were the contrivances which [Seward] was maturing with two young officers, one of the army and the other of the navy, without consulting the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy? I could get no satisfactory explanation from the President as to the origin of this strange interference, which mystified him, and which he censured and condemned more severely than myself. . . . He gave me, however, at that time no information of the scheme which Seward had promoted. . . “ (Lincoln pretended he had no idea what Seward was doing.)

From Welles’s point of view, then, as of April 1, 1861, he understood that Lincoln had given Seward authority to organize something of a military nature involving Fort Pickens at Pensacola and that he, Welles, was in charge of organizing the naval force to go to Charleston Harbor. (There could be no serious chance one would think that orders for the two expeditions might become strangely confused.)

As to the mission to Charleston, Welles reports, “It was arranged, by the War and Navy Departments that their forces—the naval vessels and transports—should meet and rendezvous ten miles due east of Charlestown Lighthouse on the morning of April 11. Each of the vessels was to report to Capt. Samuel Mercer, commanding the Powhatan.” The additional naval vessels were the Pawnee, Pocahantas, and Harriet Lane.

Welles does not say, but in a courtroom it would be reasonably found that if Lincoln did not dictate the terms of Welles’s orders to the sea captains, at least he knew what the terms were. It was through his subsequent secret order, dated April 1, but delivered to Captain Mercer on April 6 by the hand of Lt. Porter, that Lincoln pulled off his trick.

Welles sent Capt. Mercer by telegraph, the following instructions, dated April 5.

“The United States [Navy] steamers Powhatan, Pawnee, Pocahontas, and Harriet Lane will compose a naval force under your command, to be sent to the vicinity of Charleston Harbor, for the purpose of. . . carrying out the objects of an expedition of which the War Department has charge (Scott is supplying the men and material and transports, Fox is to lead them.).

The primary object. . . is to provision Fort Sumter. . . Should the authorities at Charleston refuse to permit, or attempt to prevent the vessels from entering. .  .you will protect the transports or boats, open the way for their ingress, and [remove] all obstructions to entry. . . The expedition has been intrusted to Captain G. V. Fox, with whom you will put yourself in communication. . .

You will leave New York with the Powhatan in time to be off Charleston bar, ten miles distant from and due east of the lighthouse. . . there to await the arrival of the transports (with Fox on board). . . The Pawnee, Pocahontas, and Harriet Lane will be ordered to join you. . . “

Welles sent similar instructions to the captains of the other three ships: They were to wait on station ten miles due east of the lighthouse for the Powhatan to arrive and then take their orders from Mercer. Obviously if Mercer and the Powhatan did not appear nothing would happen, except three ships and some transports would be floundering at sea.

The Situation Before Lincoln Issues His Secret Orders

From Welles’s testimony (or his son’s) the following facts are clear: First, a joint military mission was underway, the purpose of which was to force an entrance into Charleston Harbor and reinforce Fort Sumter. General Scott was supplying the expedition with transports, soldiers, ammunition and supplies; Welles was supplying four war ships, the total guns of the fleet being approximately forty guns. G.V. Fox, the originator of the plan, was to lead the force into action. But, given Welles’s orders (the source of the text of which is not known) the captains of the four ships were to rendezvous ten miles off the coast, and only once they were together, was Captain Mercer, the captain of the command ship Powhatan, to allow the fleet to move toward the harbor mouth.

Lt. David D. Porter Testifies What Happened Next.

Lieutenant, later Admiral, David D. Porter, provides his point of view, in a book published in 1885, entitled Incidents and Anecdotes of the Civil War. When Porter became involved in the story, he was under orders from Welles to go immediately to California. (He was not in Welles’s favor.) But, while he was preparing to leave for the coast, he received a note from Seward that requested he see him without delay. When he reached Seward, Seward said, Porter says, “Can you tell me how we can save Fort Pickens?” Porter says he answered, “I can, sir.” Porter told Seward that Captain Meigs, of the Army, had told him several days before that they might get several companies of soldiers together, land them by sea on the outside of Fort Pickens and in that matter reinforce the fort. Fort Pickens was located on a shoal a mile outside Pensacola Harbor, as compared to Fort Sumter, located inside Charleston Harbor. (Lincoln needed to make it seem South Carolina was about to be attacked, and to do it he meant to use the Pickens expedition as a mask.)

According to Porter’s story, he and Seward then went to the White House. Porter told Lincoln, he says, that Welles’s department of the navy was riddled with disloyal officers and spies. If Welles was in the loop, Porter claims he said, “the news would be at once flashed over the wires.” Porter continued: “But if you (Lincoln) will issue all orders and let me proceed to New York I will guarantee their execution to the letter.”

“But,” the President said, “is not this a most irregular mode of proceeding?”

“Certainly,” Porter says he replied, “but the necessity of the case justifies it.”

Seward broke in. “You are commander-in-chief. . . this is necessary. . . .”

“What will Welles say?” Lincoln asked.

“I will make it right,” Seward replied.

Assuming Porter’s book accurately reports what actually was said by Lincoln, the testimony means that Lincoln would be serverely impeached, were he to take the witness stand in a courtroom, if he attempted to deny he knew it was unsafe to pass confidential instructions through Welles’s department, as he knew it was “riddled” with Confederate spies. Yet, that is exactly what he did. He had Welles send Mercer his original orders to be ready to sail the Powhatan to Charleston.Therefore, the conclusion must reasonably follow that Lincoln intended that the Confederates know the Powhatan was going to sea, apparently under the command of Captain Mercer and on a mission to storm Charleston Harbor and reinforce Fort Sumter. (Welles’s order transmitted to Mercer by telegram)

Porter Thinks Lincoln Fooled Welles

Porter switches his narrative at this point from reporting dialogue to giving exposition: “At this very time Welles was—or supposed he was—fitting out an expedition for the relief of Fort Sumter. All the orders were issued in the usual way, and of course, telegraphed to Charlestown, as soon as written, by the persons in the department through whose hands they passed.”

Let’s stop and reflect here: So, far, according to the narratives of Welles and Porter, Lincoln has ordered that two separate expeditions put to sea; one expedition led by Fox is to force its way into Charleston Harbor; and the other, led by Porter, to go to Pensacola. The Sumter expedition is to have four ships of the line, with the command ship being the Powhatan, while Porter’s expedition has only those war vessels which are already on station in the Gulf. Lincoln issued orders to Welles for the Sumter expedition and Welles issued the formal orders to the ship captains, while Porter and Meigs, working under Seward’s supervision, wrote the orders for the Pensacola expedition. Both Fox, on the one hand, and Porter and Meigs on the other, were to go to New York to board their respective steamers for the ocean voyage.( Fox left New York on one of the transport steamers, while the Powhatan remained in port. He did not learn that the Powhatan had been taken by Porter to Pensacola until April 13^th.)

What now actually happened to cause, as Ms. Goodwin put it in her book, Lincoln’s bungling?

On April 6, Porter went abroad the Powhatan and handed secret orders to Captain Mercer, written by Lincoln, which told Mercer he was relieved of command of the vessel, and that Porter was taking the Powhatan..

(See, The Official Records of the Rebellion, Series 1, Vol. 4, 1885;  and The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Rutgers University Press, 1953, Vol IV, pp. 314-315. In a footnote the Rutgers editors state this:”The several communications addressed to Foote (Navy Yard commandant), Mercer, and Porter on April 1, as printed in various sources are all in general agreement, but our failure to locate the original documents issued in connection with the Powhatan episode leaves much to be desired in clarifying the circumstances which occasioned the several communications. . . Hence the editors have relied on the Official Records for the texts here reproduced.” (Who has possession of the original of the orders is an issue someone with the time someday may resolve. Are they written in Lincoln’s hand?)

To Porter, Lincoln gave sealed orders, to be opened once he was abroad the Powhatan and had handed Captain Mercer his orders.

Note the fact that Seward’s name appears on Porter’s order but not on Mercer’s order, though both are dated the same day. (Note, too, that both, while dated April 1, were not opened and read until April 6)

William Steward’s Role In This

From other correspondence in the Official Records, it appears that Seward either did not know of the Sumter expedition, or did not know that Lincoln had ordered Mercer to give command of the Powhatan to Porter. The relationship between Lincoln and Seward in 1861-62 is subject to some controversy. Was Lincoln treating Seward as an equal, someone whose consent he needed as a matter of politics when he was intending to do something radical, like invade native states, or  issue proclamations of freedom for slaves? Or did he use Seward’s signature when he wanted to, and ignored Seward when it suited him?

Lincoln’s Trick Was To Paralyze The Sumter Expedition By His Orders

What does Lincoln’s secret order to Mercer mean for the Sumter expedition? It means that since the Powhatan will never be appearing “ten miles off the Charleston lighthouse,” as Welles’s orders to all the ship captains specify, none of the ships can leave their station and force an entry into the harbor. To the extent transport steamers arrive and tugs arrive, nothing will happen. As Porter says, Welles’s orders, and Lincoln’s for that matter, at least those transmitted by telegraph to the commander of the Brooklyn Naval Yard (but not Mercer’s order carried by hand by Porter), were picked up by Confederate spies and the information transmitted to President Davis. Furthermore, spies at the ports of the various ships confirmed that in fact the ships put to sea with troops on board. Therefore, a reasonable person in Confederate president Davis’s shoes would think  that in fact the Lincoln government had launched a naval invasion of South Carolina, its objective to reinforce a fort that was intended by all concerned when it was built, to defend the harbor for the benefit of South Carolina, not to be used as a base of offensive operations against South Carolina. But in fact, unknown to Davis, the Powhatan was not bound for Charleston, but, by Lincoln’s truly secret order, bound for Pensacola.

The Difference Between History And Evidence

Unlike ordinary trial lawyers, historians like Ms. Goodwin are not concerned with digging deeply into a mass of material to ferret out the facts, the inconsistencies, the contradictions between what one witness says happened and what another says; they are too caught up in the rendition of their narrative to be constrained by the rigorous presentation of evidence that is required by a lawyer in a courtroom.

A trial lawyer cannot hope to win his case unless he has gathered together in his arsenal, all the statements of the witnesses, in order to show the trier of fact where the witness must be in error. Had Lincoln been put in the witness chair, how was he to explain Ms. Goodwin’s story of his bungling, when confronted with the fact that he had met with Porter, been told, according to Porter, that Welles’s department was a sieve of information; that anything passed through it would go directly into the Confederates’ hands.

Why would Lincoln adopt Porter’s suggestion to keep Welles in the dark about the Pensacola adventure (leaving it in Seward’s hands) and, yet at the same time, allow Welles to pass to the sea captains his orders about the Charleston Harbor adventure? Indeed, why order the Sumter expedition at all when it was plain the expedition could not possibly succeed in the face of the Carolinians’ artillery batteries? The inference plainly arises from these facts that Lincoln intended the Confederate government to believe he meant to attack South Carolina, when in fact he had orchrestated events to prevent the happening of that very thing.

Later, Lincoln made sure Porter escaped controversy over the direction the Powhatan took when it put to sea under his command.

No Reasonable Person In Lincoln’s Shoes Would Make This Mistake

Welles, in the book—Diary of Gideon Welles—tells this story: “My instructions to Captain Mercer were read to the President on April 5, who approved them (this is four days after Lincoln has himself written Mercer’s order to be carried by Porter). . . . Between eleven and twelve that night, Mr. Seward and his son Frederick came to my rooms at Willards, with a telegram from Captain Meigs at New York, stating in effect that the movements were retarded by conflicting orders from [me]. I asked an explanation, for I could not understand the [confusion]. I assured Seward that Porter had no command, and that the Powhatan was the flagship, as he was aware, of the Sumter expedition. . . . [We went to the White House]. The President. . . looked first at one then the other of us, and declared that there must be some mistake. . . I assured him there was no mistake; reminded him that I had read to him my confidential instructions to Captain Mercer. He said that he remembered that fact, and that he approved of them, but he could not remember that the Powhatan was the vessel. He then turned to Seward and said the Powhatan must be restored to Mercer, that on no account must the Sumter expedition fail. . . .” Did Seward, at Lincoln’s direction, send the rescinding order to Porter?)

Lt. Porter tells what happened next. “Captain Foote (commandant of the Brooklyn Naval Yard) handed me a telegram from Welles, `Prepare the Powhatan for sea.’ . . .I must telegraph to Mr. Welles.”

“Don’t make any mistake,” Porter claims to have replied. “You must obey the Commander-in-chief,” and he quoted Lincoln’s order as: “Under no circumstances will you make known to the Navy Department the object of this expedition.”

Porter, now abroad the Powhatan, continues his story. “I slipped on board the Powhatan, and locked myself in the captain’s stateroom. Captain Mercer was to remain in command until we got to Staten Island, when he was to go ashore. . . After the ship passed the bar and the pilot had left, I was to appear. Just after Mercer had been put ashore, a fast steamer signaled us. Perry, the first lieutenant, then in command of the ship, did not know who was captain, so he stopped. Lieutenant Roe came on board and delivered a telegram. It read as follows: `Deliver up the Powhatan at once to Captain Mercer,’ signed Seward. Porter telegraphed back, “Have received confidential orders from the President, and shall obey them, D.D. Porter.”

Porter then went on deck, he says, and gave the order to go ahead fast. In an hour and a half, the Powhatan was over the bar. (Despite what Welles says Lincoln said in their meeting of April 5, Lincoln did not in fact countermand his personal order to Porter, and therefore, quite reasonably, Porter refused to accept Seward’s signature as sufficient to cause him disobey the order.)

The Confederate Government Realizes Sumter Is To Be Attacked

As for the Confederate commissioners, they were duped. On April 9, with the Sumter naval expedition presumably in operation, the commissioners wrote to Seward, demanding to know when Sumter would be evacuated; by this time they had received word of the departure of the various ships and the text of Welles’s orders to Mercer and the other captains. Seward replied through Supreme Court Associate Justice, Campbell, “Faith as to Sumter fully kept; wait and see.”

President Davis, informed of this, send a message to Beauregard at Charleston, giving him discretion to fire upon Fort Sumter as soon as he saw evidence that the Union war fleet had arrived. When it was reported to Beauregard that the Harriet Lane had crept through the Swash Channel and was close to the bar, with other ships lights sighted at sea, Beauregard gave the order to commence the bombardment.

Lincoln, Like Any President, Should Not Be Immune From Criticism

Immediately upon the news of the bombardment, and the garrison’s subsequent surrender, Lincoln issued his call to the governors of the loyal states to furnish troops to suppress the rebellion, and the governors, except for those of Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee, fell into line and the thing was done: The United States was at war with the Confederacy. (Think here of Johnson with Vietnam, Bush with Iraq. Lincoln was their role model, so far not a good thing for the republic)

Why did Ms. Goodwin write her story as she did? Look through the biographies of Lincoln, going back to Tarbell’s Life of Lincoln, or Herndon’s, and you will hardly find mentioned the fact of Lincoln’s manipulation of Welles, and his deceit in causing South Carolina to fire on Sumter.

William Marvel, not quite the romantic as Goodwin, acknowledges, in his book—Mr Lincoln goes to War (2006)—the essential truth about Lincoln. “The example of the popular furor (caused by the Confederates firing on the Star of the West) may have provided Lincoln’s principal purpose in dispatching the ships. Sumter stood for the most volatile element of a delicate crisis, and Lincoln chose to handle it aggressively rather than diplomatically; he gambled on provoking a war to assure the dominance of federal authority. . . the decision to push the issue at Sumter strongly suggested a readiness to provoke an armed clash.”

Lincoln Gets What He Wants

On April 14, 1861, the Congress of the United States not in session, Lincoln made the following “proclamation: “I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, in virtue of the power in me vested by the Constitution and the laws (none that a lawyer can see), have thought fit to call forth the militia of the several states of the Union, to the aggregate number of seveny-five thousand, in order to suppress said [rebellion]. . . .” The signature line reads: “By the President, William H. Seward, Secretary of State.” (In whose handwriting is it written?)

As Carl Sandburg put it, in 1936, “Thus the war of words was over and the naked test by steel weapons, so long foretold, was at last to begin. It had happened before in other countries among other peoples bewildered by economic necessity, by the mob oratory of politicians and editors, by the ignorance of educated classes, by the greed of the propertied classes, by elemental instincts touching race and religion, by the capacity of so many men and women, and children for hating and fearing what they do not understand while believing they do understand completely and perfectly what no one understands except tenatively and hazardously.” (Abraham Lincoln: The War Years, Vol. 1.)

Footnotes

A major deficiency in the discipline of historians generally, is their failure to build their scenarios of historical events on the stolid basis of evidence, that is, documents that by their nature can be admitted into the evidence of a case tried to verdict in a courtroom. Too many times, at critical moments in the story of the Civil War, historians manufacture theories of who did what, where, and when, who said what, from sand.

To be admissible as evidence in a courtroom, a foundation must first be laid that the contents of a document are an authentic representation of what the writer actually wrote. The starting point for the process of establishing the foundation is to show, through the presentation of witness testimony or other facts, that the document in question is the original. If an alleged copy of an original is being offered instead, the circumstances under which the copy was made must be shown in evidence and they must be of such a nature that the jury may reasonably find that the document was made at or near the time of the event recorded in it, by a person with personal knowledge of the event recorded in it. A document made at a later time, say years later, may be admissible as “past recollection recorded,” but a showing must be made that the person who wrote it was a percipient witness, someone who was present when the event occurred. Finally, a writing, statement, or other facts may be admissible to impeach a witness, by means of something he was overheard to say which the witness who heard the statement, or witnessed the event, wrote down.

As the Rutgers editors point out, in the case of Lincoln’s written communications with Captain Mercer and Lt. Porter, in April 1961, the strict requirements of evidence regarding the authenticity of documents has not been met. Indeed, the Rutgers editors, in their 1936 original edition of the Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, do not give us any understanding of who wrote the documents they reproduced in the Works, or when or where. They state merely that they chose to use the typed text of communications printed in the Official Records of the Rebellion, published in 1885. Thus, we the jury have no basis upon which we can reasonably conclude that the text given to us is, in fact, the actual text Lincoln wrote or dictated as his communications to Mercer and Porter.

Lincoln may have written the messages to Mercer and Porter himself, placed them in sealed envelopes and personally handed them to Porter, Porter being instructed to give Mercer his sealed orders once he was on board the Powhatan and then open his own sealed order. Had this scenario been the actual method Lincoln used, then we know it to be highly likely that no one—not Seward, not Welles—knew that Lincoln had derailed the Sumter expedition before it had begun, until after the fact.

Seward may have written the messages at Lincoln’s dictation, or Lincoln’s secretary, Hays, might have done so. Without having in hand the original documents we have no basis to say whose handwriting appears on the documents and, hence, who was the writer of them.

Furthermore, since Lincoln’s orders were indisputably according to the evidence secret, how did it happen that copies of the original orders came in to existence? Who wrote the copies—Lincoln? Seward? Hays? Porter? When were the copies written? The same day the original was written? Within a few days of the original being written? Within a month? A year? The evidence the historians offer does not tell us. Which means we must be careful not to be fooled by history, distracted from piecing together the evidence in a way that reconciles all the known objective facts of the matter into a scenario we can say is more reasonably probable to be the true case than an alternative offered.

We know from the editors’ footnote that the Collected Works merely reprinted what text appears in the Official Records of the Rebellion. In the 1880s, a man named Gardner was charged with the task of collecting all the documents he could find, both Union and Confederate, then copy them and publish them in successive volumes. Where did Gardner get the documents he printed as Lincoln’s orders to Mercer and Porter? From the White House? The War Department? From Lincoln’s secretary, Hayes?

Obviously, the best evidence of what Lincoln wrote to Mercer and Porter is to be found in the text of the original document Porter and Mercer found when they opened the sealed envelopes and found their orders. Did Gardner gain possession of the documents Porter and Mercer possessed, copy them and print them in the OR? We do not know, the Rutgers editors do not tell us anything about what investigation they conducted to get to the bottom of this question.

In 1885, four years after Volume IV of the Official Records was published, Porter published his book, Incidents and anecedotes of the Civil War. Porter does not set forth in the book a quotation of the text of the sealed order he received from Lincoln’s hand. Instead, he gives us a narrative, a second hand restatement of the order:

“The first order was for me to proceed to New York and take possession of the steam frigate Powhatan, proceed at once to Fort Pickens. . . “

Porter does the same thing with Mercer’s order, he does not quote it, but narrates its substance as he recalled it in 1885:

“The second order was for [Mercer] informing him. . .that it was necessary for the President to confide the
execution of his plans to someone who understand them (Porter) thoroughly, . . .;
that for this reason he was compelled to detach Mercer from the command of the Powhatan. . . .”

Porter adds to this the statement that there was a third order, this one directed to Captain Foote, the Commandant of the Brooklyn Naval Yard. Porter narrates:

“The order [directed] him to fit out the Powhatan with all dispatch and with the greatest secrecy,
and under no circumstances to inform the Navy Department until after the ship had sailed.”

According to the text of the Official Records, these orders Porter describes were dated April 1. In his book, Porter states that he was at the Brooklyn Naval Yard the next day, April 2, having taken the night trains to reach New York. (Porter states that when he left Washington it was thought the Naval Yard was under the command of Commodore Breese. When he arrived, however, he was surprised to learn that Breese was on leave and Foote was in command of the yard. Thus, Lincoln’s original order to the Commandant should name Breese, not Foote, as Lincoln wrote these orders without the knowledge of Welles.)

What we can conclude from the record in front of us is that, in fact, Lincoln did send Porter to New York with sealed orders for himself and Mercer, that when he opened his orders he found himself in command of the Powhatan, and when Mercer opened his he found himself relieved of the Powhatan’s command.

Historian Goodwin’s Theory of the Case is that Lincoln “Forgot.”

The “historian” Doris Kearns Goodwin claims that, when, on April 1, 1861, Lincoln wrote or dictated the secret orders to Mercer and Porter, he had simply forgotten that Welles had ordered the Powhatan to be made ready to go to sea as the flag ship of G.V. Fox’s expedition to Charleston.

The percipient witnesses who we can expect had personal knowledge of facts which are relevant to prove or disprove Goodwin’s theory are Lincoln, Welles, Porter, Mercer and Seward.

There does not appear to be any writing of Mercer’s or Seward’s which can be used to reconstruct their knowledge of what Lincoln knew or didn’t know about Welles assigning the Powhatan to Fox’s expedition. But we do have statements in the record made Porter and by Welles or his son who had possession of Welles’s papers.

As for Welles, his statements, presented for publication by his son, in 1909, do not support Goodwin’s theory, but directly contradict it.

Welles states that his written instructions to Mercer “were read to the President on the 5th of April, who approved them.” (Dairy at p. 23.) If, in fact, Welles’s statement is true then, for Goodwin’s theory to work, Lincoln had to have forgotten on April 5 that on April 1 he had written or dictated the secret order to Mercer, relieving him of command of the Powhatan and giving it to Porter. How likely is it, to the minds of reasonable persons, that, on April 5, Lincoln could have forgotten the fact he had given the Powhatan to Porter on April 1?

Welles offers more impeaching evidence of the credibility of Goodwin’s theory. Welles states that, after he had read to Lincoln his instructions to Mercer, Seward came to his rooms at the Willard Hotel to report that there was confusion in New York about the Powhatan. (Apparently Foote telegraphed Seward inquiring about the destination of the Powhatan.) Welles states that he went with Seward to the White House, reaching it at midnight. Welles asked Lincoln to explain what had happened to cause the “confusion.” Welles then tells us his impression of Lincoln’s reaction to the question.

:”He looked first at one (Welles?) and then the other (Seward?), and declared there was some mistake.”

Welles claims to have responded to this, by saying, “I reminded him that I had read to him (just that morning) my confidential instructions to Captain Mercer.”

Lincoln, according to Welles, answered thus: “He said he remembered that fact, but he could not remember that the Powhatan was the vessel.”

What does Welles mean to say here? That Lincoln could not remember that the Powhatan was the vessel that had been selected several days before as the flag ship of Fox’s expedition to Charleston?

How could Lincoln not remember the Powhatan, as, according to Welles, Lincoln acknowledged he had not forgotten, between the morning and the night of April 5, that Welles had been in his office and had read to him his orders to Mercer, the supposed captain of the Powhatan, instructing him that he was to take the vessel on a mission Lincoln had intrusted to Fox? If Lincoln was on the witness stand in a courtroom and you were a member of the jury, would you believe him?

A final remark about Goodwin. She raised the issue of Lincoln’s intent, by writing “critics say.” Her choice of language here is telling. Why must one who questions her theory be labeled a “critic of Lincoln?” Any one who disputes her version of events is thus thrown into the category of “critic?”